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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS,
INC., a Maryland non-profit
corporation; RICHARD
ANDREWS and J. WALKER,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,
vs.

:

Case No. 92-0233

\
:
Priority # 1 6

RON WHITEHEAD, TOM GODFREY,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN,
ROSELYN KIRK and DON HALE,
Members Salt Lake Council,
Defendants/Appellants

PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES in response to the Briefs of
Appellants and of the amicus curiae the Utah League of
Cities and Towns, submits the following Brief of Appellees:

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

(a)

Issue

Was the trial court correct in ruling that article I, §
4 of the Utah Constitution prohibits defendants\appellants
Salt Lake^City Council members ("the City Council") from
encouraging and presenting prayers at city council meetings?

1

(b)

Non-Issues on Appeal

Although the City Council identifies six (6) issues on
appeal with many sub-parts (Appellants' Brief pp. 1 - 2 ) ,
there is really only one issue set forth above.
Free expression rights of City Council members are not
implicated in this action, because as elected officials
acting as government agents, defendants' official action may
be and are circumscribed by the Utah Constitution.
Footnotes 4 and 23, infra.

See

Nothing in the Order challenged

on appeal inhibits defendants own private practice of
religion including prayer while not acting as a government
official.
"Speech and debate11 immunity of legislators under the
Utah and United States Constitutions is not implicated herein, because defendants were sued in their administrative and
executive capacities rather than legislative, and those
protections apply only to members of the Utah legislature or
United States Congress, not city council members. U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 6; Ut. Const. Art. VI, § 8.

They were not

sued or enjoined because their debated or enacted the
unconstitutional practice; they were sued to prevent continuation of that practice.
The injunction as entered by the Trial Court does not
violate Rule 65A (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
because based upon common usage a reasonable person would
know and understand what conduct is now prohibited.
2

Trial courts are and should be reluctant to declare as
unconstitutional the conduct and enactments of other
branches of government.

Nonetheless, plaintiffs herein

established the unconstitutional nature of defendants'
conduct by the necessary "proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
Although two defendant City Council Members, Tom
Godfrey and Nancy Pace voted against the City Council7s
enactment of its opening prayer policy, (T.R. pp. 444-447),
neither of those defendants confessed judgment, admitted
error or conceded the unconstitutionality of the prayer
policy.

Thus, a judgment and injunction against them was

proper and necessary in this case.
Suit against individual City Council members to enjoin
their future unconstitutional conduct is and was proper.
The injunction against them limits only their official
conduct.

This action was not for personal monetary

liability but only for declaratory and injunctive relief;
the only monetary judgment herein was an award of court
costs ($103.00).

Defendants were not sued for a legislative

decision to enact their prayer policy, but for their ongoing administrative and executive acts in following the
prayer policy.
(c)

Non-Issues in this Case

Throughout this case and in their Brief, appellants
complained that the relief sought and the ruling of the
Trial Court will have disastrous effects upon all of Utah as
3

we know it today•
at issue herein:

This Court must focus on what is really
enjoining formal prayers encouraged as

part of official meetings of the Salt Lake City Council.
The plaintiffs/appellants have not argued and did not
request in this action:
To ban any and all prayer on public property; (contra
Appellants/ Brief, p. 27; p. 44) ;*
To prevent the City Council from administering oaths
using the words "so help you God"; (contra Id., p. 44);
To prevent any mention of the word God by defendants;
(contra Id., p. 15);
To prevent City Council members or members of the
public from practicing their own religion or using God's
name in vain, as long as it is not part of the official
program of the City Council meeting; (contra Id., p. 44);
To prevent the recitation of the phrase "one nation
under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance; (contra Id., p. 45);
To end the singing of the Star Spangled Banner;
(contra Id.);
To prohibit the reading from the backs of dollar bills
("In God We Trust") or from historical documents ("Grateful
to Almighty God . . . " Preamble, Ut. Const.); (contra Id.);
To invalidate legislation that makes Christmas, Easter
and Pioneer Day state holidays; (contra Id.: contra Brief of
Amicus, League, p. 22);
To end tax exempt status for churches; (contra Brief of
Amicus, League, p. 11);
To end the singing of Handel's Messiah in Symphony Hall
or the Salt Lake City & County Building or public schools;
(contra Brief of Appellants, p. 45) ;
To disallow chapels and chaplains at the Utah State
Prison;
1

Obviously such a ban would not be premissiablet under
the free exercise provisions of the Utah and United States
Constitutions.
4

To end prayers before the Utah State Legislature;2
To prevent the recitation of prayers in a city owned
cemetery; nor,
To prevent the objective teaching of comparative
religions in public colleges.
Enjoined herein is encouragement and support for formal
prayers as part of official meetings of the Salt Lake City
government, that is all. The hysteria and specter of
defendants' list of horrors might be entertaining to a first
year law student and some of the issues may warrant future
litigation, but none of them are before this Court nor were
they before the Trial Court.

This case deals solely with

government sponsored and encouraged prayer using municipal
resources as part of an official governmental meeting.

II.

Standard of Review
As determined by the court below, plaintiffs/appellees

(collectively "the Society'1) are entitled to summary
Because the trial court7s

judgement as a matter of law.

ruling is a legal conclusion, this Court should review it
for correctness. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247
(Utah 1988).

2

Although clearly unconstitutional such a practice
may be beyond judicial intervention based upon the doctrine
of separation of powers. Ut. Const. Art. V, § 1 .
5

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The constitutional provision controlling is Utah
Constitution, article I, § 4:
The right of conscience shall never be infringed.
The State shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; . . • There shall be no union
of Church and State, nor shall any church dominate
the State or interfere with its functions. No
public money or property shall be appropriated for
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution prohibits the

appropriation of public funds in the aid of religious
worship or exercise.

Accordingly, the Society challenged

the City Council's planning for and including public prayers
in the opening ceremonies of council meetings, seeking
relief to end the practice.

The City Council's policy

requires the expenditure of public money in aid of religious
exercise, threatens the strict separation of church and
state mandated by article I, § 4, and interferes with
religious autonomy.
Central to the resolution of this case is the absolute
and specific language of article I, § 4 .

Far from a mere

restatement of federal guarantees, the Utah Constitution
embodies and then expands upon the First Amendment, asserting the right of citizens to espouse their religious beliefs
6

without interference from the state, to have a government
free of sectarian influence or control and to have no public
funds spent in support of religious practices. Against
these detailed guarantees, this Court must measure the
soliciting and presenting of prayers to open city council
meetings.

Importantly, because no Utah Supreme Court cases

have interpreted the state's establishment provision in the
context of governmental prayer, the issue is one of first
impression.

II.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
On September 26, 1991, the Society filed this action

against the City Council, seeking determination that prayers
at City Council meetings is unconstitutional under article
I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.

Plaintiffs' Complaint,

Exhibit "A" attached; T.R. p. 2.

In addition, the Society

requested that the trial court permanently enjoin the City
Council from soliciting and presenting prayers as a planned
and official part of its future assemblies.

Id.

Both

parties filed motions for summary judgement.
After hearing, Judge J.D. Frederick of the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County granted summary
judgment, granting declaratory and injunctive relief,3 as
3

While the trial court's order enjoins the City
Council from "allowing or having prayers recited at meetings
of the Salt Lake City Council . . . [and] from expending
public funds, resources or property to support or encourage
such prayers," (Order Granting Summary Judgment at 2-3; T.R.
7

set forth in the court's Memorandum Decision of March 2,
1992, (Exhibit "B"; T.R. p. 978), and later embodied in an
Order Granting Summary Judgment signed April 9, 1992,
Exhibit "C"; T.R. p. 1055.
resolved on April 15, 1992.
1063.

Post-judgment motions were
Exhibit nD,f attached; T.R. p.

The City Council filed this appeal on May 1, 1992.
Judge Frederick based his decision on the specific

language of article I, § 4 , insisting that when the language
of a constitutional provision is "clear and unambiguous,w no
further examination of legislative intent is necessary.
Memorandum Decision at 11, citing
P.2d 378 (Utah 1970).

Rampton v. Barlow. 464

Because M[t]he language of the Utah

Constitution sets forth the absolute law which government
officials are bound to follow,11 the City Council's prayer
practice is unconstitutional.

Memorandum Decision at 13.

The policy of planning for and presenting public prayers at
city council meetings improperly entangled the state in nonsecular activities and expended public funds in support of
religious worship.

Id. at 13-14.

Finally, the trial court was influenced by other state
courts which have interpreted provisions of constitutions

at p. 1055), the Society understands this to mean that the
City Council may not solicit and incorporate prayers into
the official activities which make up its meetings.
Appropriately, the injunction would not govern the speech of
individual City Council members or third parties which is
not a part of the formally sanctioned functions and
operations of the meetings.
8

comparable to article I, $ 4.

Id. at 9-11.

Noting that

California and Oregon courts refused to be restricted by
federal establishment law when determining the scope of
state constitutional guarantees, the trial court likewise
declined to read the detailed and specific language of
article I, § 4 as being constrained by the First Amendment.4
Id. citing,

Sands v. Morongo Unified School District, 809

P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991); Kay v. Douglas School District, 719
P.2d 875 (Or.App. 1986), rev'd
grounds,

and dismissed

738 P.2d 1389 (Or. 1987).

on

other

The trial court also

agreed with the characterization of state sponsored prayers
as unconstitutional because the practice "appears to place
the government's stamp of approval on a particular type of
religious practice, such as public prayer."

Id.

citing

Sands at 816.

4

Clearly, the free exercise and free speech clauses
of the United States Constitution prevent the reach of
Utah's establishment guarantees from unconstitutionally
infringing upon the exercise of these First Amendment
rights. However, no such infringement occurs here. Ample
precedent indicates that teachers, for example, can be
prevented from conducting religious exercises in class rooms
in the name of separation of church and state without
violating the free exercise and speech rights of the
teachers. For example, See Bowen v. Rov. 467 U.S. 693,
699-700 (1986) ("The free exercise clause simply cannot be
understood to require the government to conduct its own
internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious
beliefs of a particular citizen."); Abinaton School District
v. Schemmpp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (right to free
exercise does not mean that individuals can "use the
machinery of the state to practice [their] beliefs");
Witters v. State Commission of the Blind. 771 P.2d 1119
(Wash. 1989).
9

Statement of Facts5

III.

On September 10, 1991# the City Council opened its
meeting with a prayer by a Salt Lake City Police Chaplin:
Our Father in Heaven, we are grateful this night
to be able to meet in this forum and we ask Thee
to bless those who participate, that their minds
will be clear and decisions will be made that will
be fair and equitable to the citizens of the city.
We are grateful for our government. We are
grateful for the land we hold. Father, we are
grateful for the safe return of our troops from
the Gulf. We ask these blessings in the name of
Jesus Christ. Amen.
Memorandum Decision at 5, f 12; T.R. p. 978. Because the
prayer appealed for guidance from and the approval of a
divine being the presentation constituted religious worship;
because he requested sanctification in the name of Jesus
Christ and refer to God as "Father" his prayer was
denominational and sectarian.

Plaintiffs7 Responser H 11,

13; Affidavit of Wm. Whisner; T.R. p. 544.

Indeed, despite

formal statements of the City Council to the contrary, at
least two members appreciate that this and all invocations
offered before the City Council were presented for religious

5

The facts are not in dispute in this case because of
defendants' failure to timely respond to certain requests
for admission from plaintiff. Requests were served by hand
upon defendants' counsel on December 3, 1991 (T.R. p. 558;
p. 923). Defendants acknowledge that they responded out of
time to those requests on January 6, 1992 (T.R. p. 925,
926). Defendants have never requested relief from their
admissions. The requests (T.R. p. 558-574) are conclusively
deemed admitted.
10

purposes.6 Memorandum Decision, J 7; Meeting Minutes,
Remarks of Nancy Pace and Tom Godfrey; T.R. p. 687.7
The Society requested the City Council halt the
practice of planning and presenting prayers at city council
meetings, defendants refused.
T.R. p. 978.

Memorandum Decision, I 13;

Plaintiffs filed suit on September 26, 1991.

Plaintiffs' Complaint; Exhibit "A"; T.R p. 2.
When the September 10th prayer was presented and prior
to October 17, 1991, the City Council had no written policy
concerning the content of the prayers to be given at its
meetings.

Memorandum Decision, J 6; Plaintiffs' Response to

Defendants's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs'
Response"), J 7; T.R. p. 655. However, responding to this
action, the City Council adopted the Opening Ceremony Policy
on October 17, 1991 by a vote of 5 to 2.

Id.

While this

formal policy declares a preference for non-denominational
and non-proselytizing presentations, the City Council is
powerless to dictate contents of prayers given at their
6

According to Tom Godfrey, Council member Hale also
admitted publicly that the purpose of including prayers in
city council opening ceremonies was religious. Meeting
Minutes, Remarks of Tom Godfrey, T.R. at 687.
7

Nancy Pace commented candidly on the City Council's
quickly enacted Opening Policy: "I don't believe that what
were doing [offering prayers] could be construed as secular
and I don't believe that would hold up in court." Meeting
Minutes, Remarks of Nancy Pace; T.R. p. 687. In the same
context, Tom Godfrey insisted that the new policy "smacks of
legal and verbal gymnastic and is therefore dishonest. It
has always been the Council's intent to offer prayers for a
religious purpose . . . ." Meeting Minutes, Remarks of Tom
Godfrey; T.R. p. 687.
11

meetings.8

Memorandum Decision, 5 8; Suggestions For Those

Who Present Thoughts/Readings/Invocations in Salt Lake City
Council Meetings; T.R. p. 687. Indeed, Council member
Godfrey acknowledged that the City Council's intention to
have non-denominational prayers has not been realized.9
Memorandum Decision, I 10; T.R. p. 978.
Prayers have not been a traditional part of Salt Lake
City government meetings.

Since the 1896 passage of the

Utah Constitution, prayers were part of city meetings for
only 28 years. Memorandum Decision, 5f 1 and 5.

From 1911

to 1979, while the Salt Lake City form of government combined the executive and legislative functions, prayers were
rarely offered during the meetings of the Commission. Memorandum Decision, 5 1; T.R. p. 978. When city government was
modified in 1980 to separate the executive and legislative
functions, prayers were usually offered as part of weekly
meetings,10 although this practice was suspended in 1987

8

Interestingly, while the suggestions requests
"thoughts, readings and invocations," the Opening Cetremony
Policy instructs the Council staff to invite ,fa wide variety
of churches and other civic organizations" to contact the
police chaplin concerning these presentations. Opening
Ceremony Policy; Suggestions For Those Who Present
Thoughts/Readings/Invocations; T.R. p. 687.
9

Interesting free exercise ramifications are caused
by the City Council even "suggesting" how one should pray.
10

Actually, between 1980 and 1987, defendants candidly
admit that their practice was to have prayers — not
thoughts or reading — as part of the city council meetings.
Defendants' Statement of Facts, H 18 and 20 Brief of
Appellants.
12

until May of 1988 while the prayer policy was reconsidered.
Memorandum Decision, J 5; T.R. p. 978. Based on this suit,
the prayer practice was again discontinued on April 19,
1992.

Order Summary Judgment; T.R. p. 1055.
The City Council acknowledges that public facilities

are furnished and public funds spent to plan for and present
prayers at its meetings. Memorandum Decision, 1 14; T.R. p.
978.

The use of city equipment (microphones, stages, etc.),

resources (electricity, paper, etc.), and employee time (to
plan for, supervise, attend, etc.) are necessary ingredients
to the scheduling, performance and witnessing of the
prayers.

Id.

For example, the City Police Chaplin

coordinated the council opening ceremonies and scheduled
religious leaders to give prayers at meetings.
Decision, 1 8 .

Memorandum

A Salt Lake City employee spent two (2) days

in the fall of 1990 soliciting religious leaders to give
prayers.

Id. 1 9 .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The absolute language of article I, S 4 prohibits the
City Council from planning for and including prayers in its
meetings.

This practice violates the Utah constitutional

guarantees of absolute separation of church and state, and
breaches the government duty not to spend public funds on
religious worship.

Given principles of statutory and

constitutional construction, this interpretation is the only
13

conclusion harmonious with Utah case law and the law of
states with similar constitutional directives.
The imperative of article I, § 4 cannot be superseded
by appeals to less reliable methods of statutory
construction.

The text of article I, § 4 is not ambiguous,

thus, the plain meaning of the provision determines and
displays the legislative intent.
constitutional language —

When faced with clear

as in this case —

courts enforce

the specific direct command of the provision.
A literal reading of article I, § 4 is consistent with
the case law from states with similar constitutional
provisions.

These state courts have been faithful to the

specific language of their state charters.

To preserve a

wall between church and state, they have upheld the
prohibition against the expenditure of public money to
support religious exercise or to aid religious institutions.
Finally, although no reported Utah cases have dealt
with religious entanglement as direct as government
sponsored prayer, those which have interpreted article I, §
4 recognize that public funds cannot spent to support
religious institutions.

Only when the challenged

appropriations did not benefit religious organizations, did
this Court approve the proposed allocation.
Accordingly, pursuant to the strong language of article
I, § 4, this Court should uphold the trial court and

14

permanently enjoin the City Council from soliciting and
presenting prayers during its meetings.

ARGUMENT
I. The Text of Article I, § 4 Is the Only Determinative and
Reliable Indication of the Purpose and Meaning of the
Constitutional Provision.
The trial court correctly relied upon the text of
article I, § 4 to declare the City Council's prayer policy
unconstitutional.

The unconditional terms of article I, § 4

leave little room for clarification.

The fundamentals of

constitutional interpretation indicate that when the
language is not ambiguous, the source of legislative intent
is the provision itself.

Resort to exotic and less reliable

statutory constructions is unnecessary and undesirable to
establish the meaning of passages subject to ready literal
interpretation.

Attempts to determine the meaning of an

instrument by references to legislative history are dubious
at best, involving guesses as to the subjective intent and
bypassing the letter of the law in favor of speculative
enterprises.

A. Only when the instrument is unclear, will this Court
look beyond the relevant text to determine legislative
intent•
To determine legislative intent, this Court invariably
looks to the text of the provision:

"[W]e being with the

statutes' plain language. We will resort to other methods
15

of statutory interpretation only if we find the language of
the statutes to be ambiguous."
Adv.Rep. 9, 10,

P2d.

State v. Vigil. 194 Utah
(1992).

The policy reasons

for relying upon statutory and constitutional language are
evident —

the court is not to act as a "super constitu-

tional convention" and must avoid imposing constructed
meaning upon the original words of a law.

General Electric

Co. v. Thrifty Sales. 301 P.2d 741, 748 (Utah 1956).
This Court is particularly willing to heed the letter
of a constitutional provision.

For example, in Hansen v.

Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980), this Court focused upon the
exact wording of state and federal provisions to determine
if the Utah constitutional protection —
ently worded —

although differ-

should be given the same import as its

federal counterpart.

Giving significance to the unique word

choice of article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution, the
Hansen Court confirmed:
In legal formulation, it is to be assumed that the
words used were chosen advisedly. This is
particularly true in such foundational documents
as constitutions, which it can be assumed are
framed with greater than usual care and
deliberation.
Id. at 317.

In self-incrimination law, this Court concluded

that the Utah guarantee which spared the accused from having
to "to give evidence against" herself "was intended to mean
something different and broader than the comparable federal
provision."

Id.

Declining to second guess the language,

16

this Court assumed the constitutional framers meant what
they said.11
While various techniques are available for interpretation of an ambiguous word or phrase in a statutory
provision, these devices are meant to supplement vague
language, never to override the text. References outside
the document are made only when the text is unclear, and
then only as an interpretive device, not as a means to
ignore or contradict the language at issue.

This Court has

repeated confirmed that principle of statutory construction,
declaring that "if we accept the view that there is present
some ambiguity . . . we may look to other sources of
11

In the context of the separation of powers, this
Court also looked to the specific language of article V, § 1
of the Utah Constitution to determine its meaning. Matheson
v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674, (Utah 1982). Reference to elements
outside the document were unnecessary to establish the
intent of the framers. The authors of the Utah Constitution
thought the doctrine of separation of powers so essential to
the workings of state government that they included a
specific provision to guarantee its preservation: "Unlike
the Federal Constitution, [this] principle is not left to be
deduced from the general structure of the Constitution."
Id, at 689. (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting, four
separate opinions). Justice Stewart insisted that the
precise wording signaled the framers' intent to secure the
independence of the various branches of the government. The
language left no room for further interpretation:
The framers of the Constitution considered the
principle embodied in article V, § 1 to be of such
importance that they wrote that provision to
prevent its erosion by implication, strained
constructions, or any means which would have the
effect of enfeebling that great, overreaching
principle of constitutional government. [emphasis
added]
Id. at 689-690.
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interpretation to clarify the instrument."

(Emphasis added)

Univ. of Ut. v. Board of Examinersf 295 P.2d 348, 360 (Utah
1956).

Accordingly, this Court ultimately relied upon text

of the Constitution to reject the contention that the
University was a constitutional corporation free from
legislative control. Id.

The Court found no textual basis

for this claim.
Alternatively, to identify the powers of the State
Treasurer, this Court was forced to examine the
responsibilities of the Territorial Treasurer to give
meaning to the phrase "other duties". Allen v. Rampton, 463
P.2d 7, 8 (Utah 1969).

However, this reference to

legislative history was necessary only because the relevant
constitutional provision made mention of the indefinite
"other duties" required of the office.

Id.

This Court did not look beyond the express langruage of
the Constitution to determine the appropriate powers of the
Governor.

Rampton v. Barlow, 464 P.2d 378 (Utah 1970).

Indeed# the language of the Constitution took precedent over
practices contrary to its dictates and long accepted by all
branches of the government:
The practical construction placed on constitutional provisions, when long acquiesced in is of
aid to the courts in determining the meaning of
the language of a constitutional provision, but it
cannot be controlling so as to amend the
Constitution by means of a series of mutual
mistakes, and especially is this true where the
language is otherwise clear. [emphasis added]
Id. at 382.
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Principles of constitutional construction hold that the
language of article I, $ 4 should be the fundamental source
of its meaning.

This is particularly true because the words

of the provision are detailed and clear, because special
deference is granted to the word choice of

constitutional

drafters, and because the provision contains no vague
references needy of further elaboration.

Finally, textual

analysis is both more reliable and more consistent with
principles of judicial restraint than attempts to divine the
meaning of words by reference outside the instrument.
Accordingly, article I, § 4 should be read as saying what it
means —

any use or appropriation of public funds in aid of

religious worship is unconstitutional.

B. Arguments Concerning Practices at the Constitutional
Convention and the Alleged Tradition of Prayer at city
Council Meetings Are Not Applicable to Interpretations of
article I, § 4.
Despite clear language of article I, § 4 , the City
Council suggests that the text of the provision be ignored
so that the meaning of the passage can be divined from
sources outside the instrument.

The City Council insists

that framers of article I, $ 4 would not have participated
in their daily practice of prayer if they considered this
exercise to be a violation of the provision they were in the
process of enacting.

This argument is suspect.

First, to become law, the Utah's Constitution had to be
approved both by the male people of the territory of Utah
19

and by the United States Congress.

When these individuals

ratified the Constitution, they did so on the basis of their
understanding of the document.

If this Court resorts to the

City Council's technique of statutory construction

—

divining the meaning from the subjective intentions of those
involved in drafting and ratifying the document —

to

interpret the document, it would have to ascertain the mind
set and review the conduct of all these many thousands of
relevant actors.

A sound alternative to this dubious

process is for this Court to assume that these actors took
the document at face value and gave its words their plain
meaning.

See, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 815 (1983)

(Brennan, J.,

dissenting)n

Second, the conduct of the delegates to the last Utah
Constitution Convention is not necessarily indicative of the
purpose and meaning of the instrument.

Importantly, their

behavior was not required to be and is not guaranteed to be
impeccable or worthy of emulation.

As Justice Brennan said

of the members of the First Congress to the United States
who began a practice of public prayers:
12

•• [Legislators,

Justice Brennan contends that actions of the First
Congress cannot be determinative of legislative intent when
the States ultimately ratified the U.S. Constitution ~ "the
understanding of the States should be as relevant to our
analysis as the understandincj of Congress." Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 at 815. Indeed, Brennan continued: "To treat
any practice authorized by the First Congress as presumptively consistent with the Bill of Rights is therefore
somewhat akin to treating any action of a party to a
contract as presumptively consistent with the terms of the
contract." Id. at 816.
20

influenced by the passions and exigencies of the moment, the
pressure of constituents and colleagues, and the press of
business, do not always pass sober judgment on every piece
of legislation they enact . . . ." Marsh v, Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 814 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting,
omitted).

footnotes

Despite their good intentions, the drafters of

the Utah Constitution may not have been able or willing to
comply with the strict mandate of the law which they and
their constituents ratified.

There is no indication that

the framers wished to codify their actions (rather than
their words) into the text of the Utah Constitution.
Instead, the framers intended to establish as law, certain
principles which they dutifully wrote down and ratified.
See, Marsh, supra,

at 816 (fl[T]he Constitution is not a

static document whose meaning on every detail is fixed for
all time by the life experience of the Framers.").
Indeed, history actually shows that the convention
delegates intentionally condoned at least two practices
which did not conform to the provisions of the Constitution
they authored.

Although all participants in the final Utah

constitutional convention were white males,13 and only males
were allowed to vote to ratify the document, the
Constitution granted women the right to vote and further
established that "[b]oth male and female citizens of this
13

Those male delegates are affectionately referred to
by the City Council as the "Founding Fathers of Utah."
Defendants7 Summary Judgment Memorandum, at 38, T.R. p. 189.
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State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious
rights and privileges."
1, Utah Constitution.

Article IV, § 2 and article IV, §

To follow the City Council's

reasoning herein, the unwillingness of the "founding
fathers" to allow women to join in drafting and enacting of
Utah's Constitution as equals should override the plain
language of these provisions.

The City Council tells us

since words do not mean what they say and the actions of
delegates are more telling of their intent —

according the

defendants' method of constitutional interpretation —

Utah

law does not recognize the right of women to vote or to
enjoy the civil rights afforded to men.14
Finally, should tradition somehow be relevant to the
interpretation of the Utah Constitution, defendants cannot
legitimately argue any long practice to allow or encourage
prayer.15

The City Council acknowledges that there were

14

Another disquieting proposition results from the
City Council's analysis of the subjective intent of the
constitution's framers. Several of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention were high members of the Mormon
Church who were practicing polygamy (despite the Church's
public anti-polygamy Manifesto of 1890) while they
deliberated on the terms of the Utah Constitution. A
significant number of the voters and community leaders that
ratified the Utah Constitution also practiced polygamy even
as they casted their ballots. Mormon Polygamy A History.
Richard S. Van Wagoner, 1989, 2nd Ed., Signature Books, Salt
Lake City, Utah.
Following the City Council's analysis herein, the Utah
Constitutional provision forever outlawing polygamy is null
and void! Ut. Const. Art. III.
15

Appeals to legislative history to interpret federal
establishment law are very rare. See, Lee v. Weisman.
U.S.
, 60 U.S.L.W. 4723 (June 24, 1992) (rejecting the
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applicability of traditional practices and historical
context to the validity of public school graduation
ceremonies). Marsh v. Chambers carved a careful exception
to federal establishment clause cases by upholding Nebraska
legislative prayer on the basis of the particular history
associated with that practice. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Marsh was uniquely exempt from the traditional inquiry
applied to establishment clause cases — no test was
utilized at all. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
After demonstrating the religious purpose of prayer, the
non-secular effect of the practice and the excessive
entanglements it involves, the dissent concludes: "In sum,
I have no doubt that, if any group of law students were
asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of
legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the
practice to be unconstitutional." Id. at 800-801. Absent
the historical unique facts applicable to the situation of
legislative prayer, the practice would readily be declared
unconstitutional.
Importantly, the Marsh analysis is not relevant to this
case. Marsh, along with all other statements of federal
establishment clause law, is based on what it means for the
state to establish a religion. For example, Chief Justice
Burger referred to the First Amendment provision to uphold
the practice of legislative prayer under federal law: "To
invoke divine guidance on a public body entrusted with the
making of the laws is not, in these circumstances, an
"establishment" of religion or a step toward establishment .
. . ." Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. at 792 (emphasis added).
He makes no mention of prohibitions against the use of
"public funds" for religious worship or the promise of "no
union" between church and state relevant to the case at bar.
The Utah Constitution is significantly different than
the First Amendment. While article I, § 4 quotes the First
Amendment, it has much more, including the statement that
"[t]here shall be no union of church and state." Further
language in the provision then indicates various ways in
which this would be guaranteed, such as: "No public money
or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the
support of any ecclesiastical establishment." With
confident language, the framers expressed a conviction that
an absolute wall of separation could be maintained. While
the federal courts may visualize the wall of separation
between church and state as blurred and variable, see Lemon
v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971), the Utah framers did
not. They unhesitantly mandated restrictions on the
spending of public funds as one way to guarantee not just a
distinct line, but a barricade, between government and
religion.
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few, if any, prayers at sessions of the City Commission (the
predecessor of the City Council) during the years 1911 1980 and that there were no prayers offered by the City
Council during the seven months from October 15, 1987
through May 17, 1988. Historical fact refutes the City
Council's claim that prayer before Salt Lake City Council
meetings is a "tradition of long standing."

At best,

assuming regular City Council prayers from 1900 - 1911, 1980
- October 15, 1987, and May 17, 1988 - 1991, approximately
seventy (70) years and seventy-seven percent (77%) of the
twentieth century has been without City government prayers.
Indeed, since the 1896 passage of the Utah Constitution,
prayers were part of City government meetings for only 28
years.

Memorandum Decision, Jf 1 and 5.

Contrary to

appellants' contention, the long and predominant tradition
of Salt Lake City government is not to have prayers.

No where in Marsh or Lemon does the Court deal with
language or with intent similar to that at issue here.
Because a discussion of the special language of article I, §
4 is lacking in federal cases, the law which they set down
does nothing more than provide a foundation upon which the
further guarantees of Utah law can be based. Suggesting
that an understanding of "establishment" is the last word on
the issue of separation between church and state is untenable. Such an approach ignores the intent of the Utah
framers, endows the federal courts with the duty of
interpreting language that is not even before them,
belittles the role of the Utah Courts in the interpretation
of its own state law, gypes the citizens of Utah of rights
promised them by their own state constitution and denies
Utah the chance to protect its citizens, in the manner it
deems appropriate, from the intrusions and power of state
government.
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The task of establishing legislative intent beyond the
text of article I, § 4 is an uncertain process.16

Because

the actual 1896 discussion of article I, § 4 by delegates
was minimal,17 little evidence exists to establish what was
on the minds of the delegates —

much less the voters —

when they framed and adopted the provision.18

In addition,

the conduct of these individuals is not necessarily an
indication of how the instrument is to be interpreted.
Fortunately, in pursuit of good government, the ideals of

16

Defendants artfully attempted to manufacture
legislative intent in this case by including in the.Opening
Ceremony Policy as they adopted, claims of a secular purpose
in offering prayers. T.R. pp. 444-447. At least two (Tom
Godfrey and Nancy Pace) and maybe three (Tom Hale)
defendants have publicly stated that the claimed purpose is
false and that prayers have always been and will continue to
be offered by the City Council for religious purposes. T.R.
p. 687.
Finding the real legislative intent in the adoption of
the Open Ceremony Policy will be difficult with these public
statements that directly contradict the manufactured intent
of the written policy.
17

See, Proceedings
and Debates
Constitutional
Convention
(1897).
18

of the

Utah

The City Council contends that the "obvious"
motivation behind the adoption of the Utah Constitution was
the desire to gain statehood. Since the last Utah
Constitutional Convention was replete with appeals to the
authority of other states and void of "expressed intent",
the City Council suggests that this Court look to the
circumstances surrounding the enactment of the provision.
This argument ignores the possibility that an absence of
expressed intent was a sign of unanimity or an indication
that the authors believed that the words of the provision
spoke for themselves and needed no further clarification
from the court. Certainly, the City Council is not
suggesting that the framers were deceiving the Utah voting
public and the United States Congress by enacting a
Constitution the plain meaning of which they did not intend.
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individuals, not necessarily their actions, are perpetuated
and emulated.

Lastly, even if the behavior of the drafters

were considered, there is NO tradition of prayer at City
Council meetings.

Rather than speculate on unresolvable

issues, this Court should enforce the plain language of
article I, § 4, which prohibits the City Council from
presenting prayers at meetings.

II. State Courts Faced With Specific and Demanding
Provisions Similar To Article 1*5 4 Have Rigorously
Enforced the No-Aid Mandates of Their Constitutions.
Strict state constitutional language, similar to the
text of article I, § 4,19 has been the basis of a clear
divergence from federal establishment law in other states.
The courts in these states have upheld the rigorous language
of state provisions and have repeatedly enforced and the
strict no-aid mandates. Accordingly, these state decisions
confirm the conclusion that the City Council's prayer
practice is unconstitutional.

19

Despite public comments to the contrary, Utah's
constitutional establishment provisions is not out of the
ordinary. In addition to the California, Oregon and
Washington provisions quoted elsewhere in the brief, many
state constitution are as detailed and as adamant in their
separation of church and state. For a complete listing of
the various state constitutional provisions dealing with
establishment, free exercise and no aid to religious sects
and schools see Exhibit M E H attached hereto.
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A. Washington state case law, interpreting a provision
almost identical to article I, § 4, has consistently
enforced the strong language of its no-aid provision.
History indicates that Utah borrowed its establishment
provision from the Washington State Constitution and indeed,
the similarities between the two provisions confirm this.
Hickman, Utah Constitutional

Law, Doctoral Thesis,

University of Utah (1955) at 40-79.

Article I, S 11 of the

Washington Constitution20 recites that M[n]o public money or
property shall be appropriated for, or applied to any
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support
of any religious establishment.11

In equally strong

language, article IX, S 4 of the Washington Constitution
guarantees that public schools will be free of sectarian
control or influence.21

The Washington Supreme Court has

maintained strict separation of church and state and has
repeatedly found the specific and absolute language of its

20

Wash. Const, art. I, § 11 has been amended twice, in
1904 to allow employment of chaplains at state prisons and
in 1957 to allow chaplains at mental institutions.
21

Wash. Const, art. IX, S 4 reads: "All schools
maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public
funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or
influence." Utah has a similar provision. Utah
Constitution Article X, SS 1 and 9. Although the
prohibition of sectarian influence on public schools is not
directly relevant to the issues of government prayer, most
state establishment case law involves public schools and so
relies in part on provisions such as article IX, § 4.
However, the holdings in these cases often deal separately
with the more broad text of the state establishment clause.
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state charter to demand analysis independent of and more
rigid than federal precedent.
Weiss v. Bruno. 509 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1973), challenged a
tuition scheme to benefit disadvantaged students attending
private schools and colleges.

To invalidate this program,

the Washington Court held that the proscription of article
IX, § 4 was determinative.

Contending that the provision

was "far stricter than the more generalized prohibition of
the first amendment,,f the Court held that:
There is no such thing as a M e minimis' violation
of article IX, § 4. Nor is a violation of this
provision determined by means of a balancing
process. The words of article IX, § 4 mean
precisely what they say; the prohibition is
absolute.
Far from surprising, Weiss followed a line of cases of
literal reading of the absolute terms of the state Constitution.

Previously, the Washington Court held that publicly

funded transportation of children attending parochial
schools violated both article I, § 11 and article IX, § 4.
Mitchell v. Consol. School District No. 201, 135 P.2d 79
(Wash. 1943), and Visser v. Nooksack Valley School District
No. 506. 207 P.2d 198 (Wash. 1949).

Further, the Court

specifically rejected arguments that it should permit public
transportation of private school children because such a
program had been sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Visser, 207 P.2d at 205. n

Consistent with its rejection of

direct and indirect aid to religious schools, the Court also
struck down state-sponsored loan programs for college
students at religious schools.

State Higher Educ.

Assistance Auth. v. Graham, 529 P.2d 1051 (Wash. 1974).
Witters v. St. Comm. of the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash.
1989) is the Washington Court's most recent rigid interpretation of the state's constitutional guarantees. After the
U.S. Supreme Court found state assistance to a blind student
pursuing a theological education valid under the First
Amendment, the Washington State Supreme Court accepted the
federal high Court's offer ,fto consider the applicability of
the xfar stricter' dictates of the Washington State
Constitution.•• Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Services for the
Blind, 475 U.S. 481, 489 rehfg

denied,

475 U.S. 1091 (1986).

Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the state
assistance did not have the primary effect of advancing
religion, Id. (citing

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602

(1971)), the Washington Court concluded that under article
I, § 11, no appropriations could be made for the applicant

22

The Court wrote:
[W]e must, in light of the clear provisions of our
state constitution and our decisions thereunder,
respectfully disagree with those portions of the
Everson majority opinion which might be construed,
in the abstract, as stating that transportation,
furnished at public expense, to children attending
religious schools, is not in support of such
schools.
Visser, 207 P.2d at 205. (emphasis in original).
29

without violating the prohibition against public funds for
religious instruction.

Witters. 771 P.2d at 1143-1144.*

The Court heeded the '"sweeping and comprehensive' language
of Const, art. I, § 11, which prohibits not only the
appropriation of public money for religious instruction, but
also the application of public funds to religious
instruction."

Id. at 1122 (guotingr, State ex rel. Dearie v.

Frazier, 102 Wash. 369 at 375, 173 P.2d 35 (1918) (emphasis
original).
Precedents of the Washington Court are instructive.
That Court held that the foundation of their establishment
law is the text itself and has refused to vary from its duty
to enforce the letter of the law.

Because the relevant

provisions of the Washington Constitution have no
counterparts in the federal constitution, the Washington
Court has declined to limit its Constitution by
interpretations of the First Amendment.

Accordingly, the

Washington Court has prohibited, absolutely, the public
funding of religious worship, instruction, institutions and
exercise.

The lessons of Washington apply to interpretation

of Utah's Constitution.

As Weiss suggests, there can be no

de minimus violation of article I, § 4's absolute ban on
public funding of religious exercise —

23

the prohibition is

The Witters state court decision also rejected
arguments that the denial of aid threatened the applicant's
free exercise rights or implicated equal protection. Id. at
1122-1124.
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absolute.

Nor can the sweeping and comprehensive language

of article I, § 4 be limited by federal establishment law.
Applying Witters, regardless of debates as to the primary
purpose or effect of any particular appropriation, article
I, § 4 prohibits government from spending public funds on
religious exercise.

There is no exception to article I, § 4

on the basis of secular purpose or effect; nothing in the
text or the history approves to government funding of a
religious exercise if there is some secular effect.
B. Appeals for a lenient interpretation of article I, § 11,
founded on the history of the Washington Constitutional
Convention are problematic, unpersuasive and have been
rejected by the Washington Court.
The Washington Court has been always faithful to the
language of its no-aid provision.

Interestingly# in defense

of article I, § 11, the state court has rejected an argument
similar to —

but with an interesting twist —

herein by the Salt Lake City Council.

that advanced

The Washington Court

specifically refused to conclude that despite the rigid
language of article I, § 11, a milder interpretation is more
consistent with the document's history and purpose. Witter
at 1129 (Utter, J., dissenting)

(advancing this contention).

Critics of the Washington Court's "anti-establishment
bias11 argue that history reveals that a tempered reading of
article I, § 11 and article IX, § 4 is a more in line with
the current interpretation of the framers' intent.
& Vache, The Establishment

Clause
31

and Free Exercise,

Conklin
8 Puget

Sound L.Rev. 418; Witter 771 P.2d at 1124-1132 (Utter, J.,
dissenting); Utter & Larson, Church and State
Frontier:

The History

Washington

State

of the Establishment

Constitution,

Law Quarterly 451 (1988).

on

the

Clause

in

the

15 Hastings Constitutional
These commentators encourage less

reliance upon the text in favor of emphasis upon the record
of the constitutional convention and perceived prevailing
attitudes toward religion in the nation at the time to
interpret the provisions,24
After careful documentation of the "Mormon question"
and the "Catholic question", Conklin and Vache conclude that
the anti-establishment tone of Washington Constitution
expressed intolerance of non-mainstream religion.
Vache, supra.25

Conklin &

These authors argue that the framers'

express intent should not be followed because changing
contexts today should change interpretation of the
provisions.

Conklin & Vache, supra

at 457.

Because the

late 1800s' anti-Catholic and anti-Mormon bias which lead to
the strong wording of the Washington Constitution is no
longer a reality in today's modern era of toleration, the

24

The Washington Constitution was drafted in 1889.

25

While Utter and Larson suggest that determination
original intent is an uncertain endeavor# they urge that the
"sincere and thoughtful" convictions of the delegates should
influence modern interpretations of the document. Church
and State on the Frontier,
15 Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly at 478. What concerned these constitutional
delegates, these authors argued, was not religious
influences, but the specter of sectarianism. Id.
32

Court should "entertain the possibility that the
interpretation must change to accommodate modern
conditions."

Id.

They contend that because that the

wording of article I, § 11 was over-reactionary then, the
constitutional language should now be moderated through
judicial re-interpretation.
Although this argument was rejected by the Washington
Court, the Conklin and Vache analysis has some interesting
implications for the case at bar.

From one perspective,

this analysis supports the Society's claims that government
meeting prayer is unconstitutional.

If, at the relevant

time, the prevailing national mood was one of intolerance,
this evidence suggests that the Washington and Utah framers
all actually intended to erect a large and solid wall
between church and state and to forbid absolutely any
expenditure of public funds to support religious
activities.26

The convention delegates chose to exclude

26

On a historical note, pending before the United
States Congress for many years beginning in 1875 was a
proposed amendment to the United States Constitution drafted
by James G. Blaine, United States Senator from Maine,
directed at the individual states and providing in its
original form:
Article XVI: No State shall make any law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in
any State for the support of public schools, or derived
from any public fund therefor, nor any public land
devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any
religious sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands
so devoted be divided between religious sects or
denominations•
33

mainstream religious influences from the public sphere by
prohibiting the government from becoming entangled in
religion at all. At this juncture Conklin and Vache argue
for a departure from legislative history and strict
establishment in favor of a revisionist more tolerant notion
of the separation of church and state.
rather than a lenient —

However, a strict —

reading of article I, § 4 is

appropriate if the Conklin and Vache rendition of delegative
history is adopted and allowed to influence interpretation
of the provision.

The delegates intended an uncompromising

separation of church and statte.27 Thus, the absolute law
embodied by article I ( $ 4 prohibits public expenditures in
support of religious exercise and prohibits the City Council
from funding prayer.
However, if the second prong of the Conklin and Vache
analysis is also accepted —

the argument that changing

times should change the interpretation of the document —

Congressional Record: Containing The Proceedings and
Debates of the Forty-Fourth Congress, First Session.
Later revisions added even stronger language prohibiting
federal, state and municipal aid to religious institutions.
This Blaine Amendment, never passed by Congress,
resulting in part from anti-Catholic and anti-Mormon
sentiment of the last half of the 1800's, had an influence
on state constitutions adopted during that period.
27

Ut. Const, art. Ill provides "Perfect toleration of
religious sentiment is guaranteed." The only manner in
which to accomplish that exemplary goal is by strict
adherence to the absolute prohibition of government aid or
support to any religion or any religious practice. Ut.
Const, art. I, § 4.
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the result is improper judicial activism.

For example,

trying to decipher the disposition of the nation or a state
(or what it was at a given time) is close to impossible.

If

the mind set of the nation is indeed to be established,
constitutional convention delegates are in best position to
do so, and to embody this wisdom in the words of the
Constitution.

Further, to the extent that this mood is

somehow ascertainable, still left unresolved is the proper
correlation between a particular mood and the reading of the
Constitution.

There is no consensus to suggest that a more

relaxed stance on establishment law is more in line with an
atmosphere of toleration than in line with a strict
separation of church and state.

Perhaps true religious

toleration entails that a no-aid provision be enforced with
greater vigor, preventing the state from becoming entangled
in religious matters and from inviting a return to the era
of intolerance.28

Again, delegative written judgment and

deliberate word choice are the best sources of a solution to
this dilemma.

One must assume that the delegates properly

registered the mood of the state and of the people and
documented the result as a constitutional charter.

28

The establishment clause is not an goal or end in
and of itself. The purpose for the establishment clause is
to strengthen the free exercise clause and to protect an
individual's right to freely worship. The stronger the
establishment provision is, the stronger is the right to
free exercise!
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A further problem with the Conklin and Vache approach,
and a further problem with any attempt to determine
delegative intent# is that motives are difficult to assess
and they are not necessarily enlightening even if there are
discernable.

The Washington Constitution may have been

written in a time of when Christianity was seen by most as a
positive influence upon society and Protestants dominated
public schools# when the fear of Catholics and their
alternative schools threatened many and when Mormons were
discriminated against because their unusual religious
practices offended the nation's intolerant sensibilities.
From these observations, however, Conklin and Vache
assume the worst —

the delegates were intolerant and

therefore Washington's article I, § 11 is an expression of
an undesirable motivation.

Alternatively, Utter and Larson

insist that the delegates sought to avoid only sectarianism,
speculating that the delegates were not able to express
themselves accurately.

Importantly, both views disregard

the possibility that the delegates were offended by the
treatment of the Mormons and by the views which perpetuated
discrimination against Catholics and which wrongly dominated
the public school system.

Perhaps a strict separation

between church and state was, from the perspective of these
delegates and Washington's voters, the best remedy for a
potentially volatile situation.
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The strong language of

article I, § 11 represents a credible and tolerant attempt
to prevent or end religious bigotry.
Raising more issues than it resolves, reliance upon
legislative history to interpret a constitutional provision
is speculative.29 Appropriately, the Washington Supreme
Court bases its state establishment law upon the "sweeping
and comprehensive" language of article 1,5 11 rather than
judicial notions of what may or may not have been the intent
of framers.

This language prohibits Washington from funding

religious activities with public money as, on its face, the
language of Utah's article I, S 4 prohibits the City Council
from funding prayer at governmental meetings.

C. Consistent with the Washington Court, the courts of
other states with constitutional no-aid provisions have
rigidly enforced the absolute language of their state
provisions.
Without speculating on the intent behind the words, the
Washington Supreme Court has chosen to interpret the
absolute language of article I, § 11 and article IX, § 4 as
mandating a strict separation between church and state.
With language similar to that of the Washington
Constitution, courts in neighboring states have also taken a
defensive posture against attempts of government to
establish religion.

See footnotes 6, 7 & 16 above.
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In Sands v. Moronao Unified School District. 809 P.2d
809 (Cal. 1991) the California Supreme Court found that
prayers at high school graduation ceremonies violated the
state constitution.30

Because article XVI, S 5 of the

California charter "prohibits not only material aid to
religion but any official involvement that promotes
religion," government endorsement of graduation prayers was
deemed unconstitutional.

Sands. 809 P.2d at 820.

Additionally, the "no preference" clause of California's
article I, § 4 —

more protective of separation than the

federal provision ~

was violated when the government

appeared to take "positions on religious questions," by
including prayer at graduations.

Id.

Rejecting a more dubious application of the incidental
benefit theory argued in the court below, the California
Supreme Court concluded that a textbook loan program to
students of private schools was unconstitutional.

Calif-

ornia Teachers Assoc, v. Riles. 632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1981).
The Riles Court adopted a two-part test to determine if
30

Article I, § 4 of the California Constitution
guarantees the "[f]ree exercise and enjoyment of religion
without discrimination or preference, . . . " while article
XVI, § 5 provides: "Neither the Legislature, nor any
county, city and county, township, school district, or other
municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, or
pay from any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or
in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian
purpose whatever. . . . " and article IX, § 8 states:: "No
public money shall ever be appropriated for the support of
any sectarian or denominational school, and any school not
under the exclusive control of the officers of the public
schools."
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government aid violated the constitution, asking first if
the benefit derived from the program was direct or indirect
and second, if the aid was substantial or incidental.
at 962; Sands, 809 P.2d 809 (Mosk, J. concurring).

Id.

Applying

the first prong of this test, the Court concluded that
providing textbooks to children supports both the students
and the school, thus, the program impermissibly benefits the
sectarian school.

Id. at 962-963. Under the second prong,

the Court found that text books, unlike fire protection,
advance the central objective of the sectarian schools —
education of children.

Id. at 963. The Court avidly

rejected the assumption that secular texts would be used for
secular instruction only.

Id. at 963-964.

Two California cases, Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587
P.2d 663 (Cal. 1978), and Okrand v. City of Los Angeles, 207
Cal.App.3d 566 (Cal.Ct.App. 1989) deliberated the
constitutionality of government sponsored religious
displays.

In Fox, the California Supreme Court held that

under article I, § 4 , government may not prefer one religion
over another and may not appear to act prefer-entially.
Fox, 587 P.2d at 665-666. Although for 30 years a cross had
been illuminated on the Los Angeles City Hall without
citizen complaint, the Court rejected the argument that the
public did not perceive the display as a preference by the
city.

Id. (silence on the part of the religious minority

does not represent disinterest).
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Because other holiday

symbols were included in the display challenged in Okrand,
an unlit Menorah in the city hall was not a violation of the
"no preference" clause.

Okrand. 207 Cal.App.3d at 574.

Oregon, too, has declared graduation prayers unconstitutional on the basis of a no-aid provision31 in the state
constitution.

Kay v. David Douglas School District No. 40,

719 P.2d 875 (Or.App. 1986), rev'd
justiciability,

and dismissed

738 P.2d 1389 (Or. 1987).

for

lack

of

In KaY, the

Oregon Court interpreted the prohibition of article I, § 5
strictly, finding it applicable even though a teacher
offering the prayer volunteered her times
The fact that money spent on the preparation and
delivery of the invocation was not apportioned and
identified as a "line item" in the budget does not
take it out of the proscription of section 5,
which prohibits the spending of any money for the
benefit of any religious or theological
institution.
Id. at 878 (emphasis original).

Declining to conclude

whether, by itself, the minimal expense was unconstitutional, the court declared that the "wall of separation
between church and state" mandated by the provision was also
breached.

Id.

When taken as a whole, the court held

Article I, § 5 of the Oregon Constitution states:
No money shall be drawn from the
treasury for the benefit of any
religious [sic] or theological
institution, nor shall any money be
appropriated for the payment of any
religious [sic] services in either house
of the Legislative Assembly.
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section 5 forbids "far more" than just direct payments in
support of a religious institution.

!£. at 878.

These cited cases show the inclination of state courts
to interpret state constitutional provisions independently
of federal law and to uphold the stricter separation of
government and religion often mandated in these states.
Again, the law of Utah's sister states confirms the
Society's claims in this case.

For example, applying the

reasoning of the California Court to this case indicates
that article I, § 4 would allow incidental benefits to
religious institutions in Salt Lake City such as fire
protection and waste removal.

These benefits are incidental

to broad programs insuring the safety and welfare of all
city inhabitants.

Alternatively, an expenditure which

directly aids religious worship like the funding of prayer
at City Council meetings is unlawful.

The encouragement and

financing of City Council prayer is aimed bluntly at
religious worship.

The benefit to religious worship —

encouragement of prayer —

the

is not an incidental by-product

of a program with other lofty societal goals.32
32

An incidental benefit theory should not be confused
with the Lemon secular purpose or effect test. The former
analysis is concerned with a challenged practice that
benefits religious practice insignificantly and indirectly
as part of a broad program. The latter test, however, does
not look at the manner in which the religious practice is
benefitted, but the character of the practice itself. The
questions pertinent to the Lemon inquiry are whether the
practice primarily has a religious purpose or effect. The
California Court was not concerned with whether prayer or
text books for religious schools had secular purposes or
41

III. Although this Court Has Yet To Fully Interpret the
Extensive Guarantees of article I, § 4, Existing Case Law
Confirms the Unconstitutionality of the City Council.
The detailed language of article I, § 4 has not gone
unnoticed by this Court.

Recognizing that the provision

mandated constitutional guarantees more complete and more
specific than those of federal establishment law, Justice
Crockett insisted:
Section 4, article I# of the Utah Constitution . .
. is more articulate and express in assuring
religious liberty and prohibiting discrimination,
or church interference with private or public
rights, than the generality of the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution.
Manning v. Sevier County. 517 P.2d 549, 552-553 (Utah 1973)
(Crockett, J.# concurring).

This Court has not had the

opportunity to develop an analysis premised upon the
protections specified in the provision —

the principles

have only been applied generally in the few reported
cases.33
effects beyond their religious purposes and effects.
Instead, the Court was concerned if the aid to religious
practices and institutions were more than indirect and
negligible. This, the Court found to be true. Again, no
argument concerning secular purposes and effects is relevant
to analysis under California Constitution nor should it be
relevant to this Court's analysis.
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While this Court has not had the opportunity to deal
at length with article 1, § 4 of the Utah Constitution, the
Court has developed a body of state law based on other
unique provisions of the state constitution. For example,
in KUTV. Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513 (Utah 1983), the Court
undertook the interpretation of article 1, § 15 of the Utah
Constitution even though the issue before the court could
have been concluded under federal law. Noting that the
provision had never been authoritatively interpreted, the
Court took on the task, surveying discussion of the
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Twice in 1948, this Court resolved challenges under the
state's no-aid provision.

In Gubler v. Ut. State Teachers'

Retirement. 192 P.2d 580 (Utah 1948), the Court upheld a
retirement plan which allowed public school teachers to
receive credit for years spent teaching in private schools.
Since the program enticed experienced teachers away from
private schools and gave them retirement credit after they
had joined the public school system, the Court held that the
scheme did not involve the appropriation of public funds for
religious instruction.

Id. at 585-587. However, the Court

carefully pointed out that f,no public money or property has
been appropriated or is being applied to any religious
worship, exercise, or instruction.

We fail to see how the

amendment in any way breaches the wall between church and
state."

id. at 587 (emphasis added).34

provision at the Constitutional Convention. Id. at 518-519.
Because the intent of the authors was not forthcoming from
delegative history, the Court turned for guidance to the
judicial decisions — especially those prior to the 1895
Convention — in states with constitution provisions similar
to Utah's. Id. After lengthy analysis of these cases, the
Court concluded that although freedom of the press was not
intended to be absolute or superior to other constitutional
guarantees, the delegates and voters who framed the and
adopted article 1, § 15 intended the provision to be "at
least as protective of [freedom of the press] as the First
Amendment." Id. at 521.
34

Interestingly, the City Council quotes this same
passage to support its contention that article I, § 4 is
somehow limited to "an anti-establishment provision
prohibiting the creation of an institutional church."
Appellants' Brief at 36. While article I, § 4 is certainly
an anti-establishment provision, its protections are
specific, prohibiting the expenditure of public funds in
support of religious worship and exercise. The Gubler Court
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On similar grounds, this Court refused to enjoin the
use of state funds for the construction of a memorial
building by an historical society, the Daughter of Utah
Pioneers.

Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers. 197 P.2d

477 (Utah 1948).

The Court declared that without "positive

evidence of the efforts on the part of [the] society to
favor any particular religion,,f it would assume that the
ultimate character of the project would be secular.
489 (emphasis original).

Id. at

Because the group was a non-

religious , historical society, the Court did not need to
test Utah's no-aid provision —

the appropriation would not

benefit an "ecclesiastical establishment."

Id.

In 1973, this Court sustained a plan for municipal aid
for the construction of a hospital by a church corporation.
Manning v. Sevier County. 517 P.2d 549 (Utah 1973).

How-

ever, the scheme was found to be constitutional because
extensive regulations in the lease explicitly prevented
religious activities in the hospital and would reduce or
eliminate any incidental governmental benefits to a
religious institution.

Id. at 551-552.35

clearly recognized this, insisting that the retirement plan
did not violate the no-aid provision. Gubler, 192 P.2d at
587. The City Council characterization of the provision is
unpersuasive.
35

The lease provided "that there will be no chapels or
other religious rooms set aside at the hospital and there
will be no religious symbols or plaques contained therein;
that the name of the hospital shall not contain a reference
to any religious denomination; that no proselyting by any
religious sect or distribution of literature, books,
44

Although these cases do not interpret article I, § 4 in
the context of government prayer, they lay the foundation of
analysis appropriate for this case.

This Court was

persuaded by the direct language of article I, § 4 to
examine whether a proposed expenditure will benefit a
religious institution or practice.

The Court demonstrated

that the Gubler retirement plan advantaged teachers only
after they became public school teachers, that the Thomas
appropriation would benefit a secular institution with
secular purposes, and that the Manning hospital was stripped
of any religious purpose as funded.

Importantly, when the

challenged expenditure was intended to fund a project under
the direction of an non-governmental institution this Court
assumed that the money would not be used for religious
worship or exercise.

For example, rather than doubt the

intentions of the pioneer society, the Thomas Court assumed
in absence of evidence to the contrary, that the purpose of
the memorial was secular.

To determine otherwise would be

speculating on the future actions of the pioneer society.
Similarly, given the provisions of the lease to insure that
the hospital would be non-religious, the Court was assumed
that the hospital's future activities would be secular.
In contrast, in the case of the Salt Lake City
Council's prayer policy, there is no question as to the
brochures, symbols or other activities relating to or being
of a proselyting nature shall be in said hospital."
Manning, 517 P.2d at 551.
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results of the challenged expenditures.

This case does not

involve appropriations to fund a future non-religious
project.

Instead, this case involves direct funding, by the

government, of religious worship in which the government is
a participant.
removed.

Any uncertainty of intent and purpose is

The City Council's practice directly involves the

government in religious worship as a result of the
appropriations.

By encouraging prayer at its meetings, the

City Council has supplied the "positive evidence" of
religious aid not found in Thomas.36 Unlike the hospital
lease of Manning. there is no scheme to insure that the
expenditure will not support religion —

the City Council is

powerless to dictate the content of the prayers to be given
and is enmeshed in the religious aid avoided by the lease
stipulations.

And by planning for and presenting prayers as

part of their opening ceremonies, the City Council uses
public funds to directly support the religious practice of
prayer, a situation not found in Gubler.

36

Religious favoritism is evident, not only when one
religion or sect is preferred over another, but also when a
particular religious practice — in this case, public prayer
— is sanctioned or encouraged.
The support of public government prayer, offensive to
some religious denominations, evinces support of religion in
general and yet inherently offenses certain religious
denominations.
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In addition, no questions remain as to the nature of
City Council prayer as religious worship.37

The City

Council failed to explain away the clearly religious
ramifications of the prayers offered at its meetings.

As

the comments of two defendants indicate, the City Council's
prayer is offered for religious purposes.38 Attempting to
minimize the inherently religious nature of the public
prayer, defendants' Opening Ceremonies Policy terms prayer
as "non-denominational11.

But compare the clear

denominational prayer offered on September 10, 1991 which
caused this suit.
Similarly, defendants now attempt to disguise or
confuse prayer as a secular practice by comparing it to
references to God such as those on coins or in the Pledge of
Allegiance.

However, the City Council's active encourage-

ment of public prayers is vastly different from a passive
reference to God on filthy lucre or in historical documents
such as the Preamble to the Utah Constitution.

Due to their

widespread and almost reflexive use, such mottos and other

37

Prayer is: Attempted intercourse with God, with or
without the mediation of priests or heavenly beings; it is
usually, but not necessarily, vocal. It is designed by
means of the creation of personal contact to affect the
nature and course of the relationship. Its means and ends
always depend on how the nature of God is conceived.
Interpreters Dictionary of the Bible, Copyright 1962,
11th Printing, 1980, Abingdon, Vol. 3, p. 857.
38

See footnotes 6, 7 & 16 above.
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rote public references to divinity have lost any true
religious significance.

See Marsh v, Chambers. 463 U.S.

783, 818 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

The City

Council's explanations cannot hide the purposes, effects and
expectations surrounding a prayer.

Prayer is different than

the depersonalized and non-religious acknowledgement of God
in daily public affairs.

Despite defendants' efforts to

confuse the scared with the profane, the two remain
decidedly distinct.

CONCLUSION
Given the language of her Constitution, Utah has a
unique obligation to its citizens.

State law mandates

uncompromising separation of government and religion and
bans public funds use for religious purposes.

Utah's

citizens are guaranteed the right not to have taxes spent on
religious exercises, the right to have a government free
from non-secular influences and the right to complete
religious autonomy.

These added guarantees comprise what

the authors of Utah's Constitution thought to be necessary
"to secure and perpetuate the principles of free government.
. . .w

Preamble, Utah Const.

Far from redundances, these

words set forth absolute law which Utah governmental
officials are duty bound to follow.
If necessary to search in other jurisdictions for
guidance, this Court can consider the sincere effort of
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sister states to secure the full extent of the rights and
liberties owed to their citizens.

Provisions in other state

constitutions similar to article I, $ 4 have been found to
be absolute prohibitions against expenditure of any
governmental money to aid or encourage prayers.
Although limited, Utah case law interpreting article I,
§ 4 also supports a constitutional ban on City Council
prayer.

To plan for and present prayer involves the

appropriation of public funds to allow city officials to
engage in religious worship.

To the City Council's

purposes, tax revenues are unlawfully appropriated for the
religious exercise and the strict separ-ation of church and
state is breached.

Given the clear mandate of article I, §

4, the City Council's practice cannot stand.
Article I, $ 4 needs no more analysis.

Interpretative

appeals to delegative history are dubious —

if not unsound

— when a constitutional provision is clearly worded.

How-

ever, an interpretation of the Utah framer's original and
real intent gives even more force to the Society's
arguments.

The pioneers of Utah were especially sensitive

to the issues between church and state.

Many of them

victims of religious persecution sanctioned by the states of
Illinois and Missouri, these individuals held particular
respect for the differing religious choices of the people of
their state.

They were particularly aware of the dangers of

religious factionalism and violence which can accompany
49

state involvement with religion.

Many of Utah's pioneer

inhabitants were treated as outcasts from the nation because
of their religious affiliation.

They wanted to ensure that

in their new state, no one would feel isolated from their
government because the government was contributing to a
religious practice with which they did not agree.

And so,

with more fortitude and experience than the framers of the
United States Bill of Rights, these Utahns determined that
religious freedom and perfect tolerance require that the
government not aid or otherwise put its stamp of approval on
any religion or on religion in general.

To protect these

values, the people of Utah anticipated a need for a great
and strong wall between church and state and a prohibition
against public funding of religious exercise.

Thus, they

clearly wrote and then ratified article I, § 4.
The City Council's practice of government sponsored
prayers violate the Utah Constitution.

The decision of the

trial court should be affirmed.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

SOCIETY OF
SEPARATIONISTS, INC.,
a Maryland non-profit
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS;
and J. WALKER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

COMPLAINT
C i v i l No.

91-090-6136

RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake
City Council
(Hon.

Defendants.

J.D. FREDERICK

)

PLAINTIFFS, as a cause of action against defendants
RONALD WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS, NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN,
TOM GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and TOM HALE, members of the Salt
Lake City Council, state and allege as follows:

PARTIES
1.

The Society of Separationists, Inc. is a Maryland

non-profit corporation registered to do business in Utah.

One of the corporate goals of the Society and the Utah
Chapter of the Society is to preserve and maintain the
separation of church and state as required by the Utah
Constitution (Art. I, § 4).
2.

The Utah Chapter of the Society of Separationists,

Inc. is made up of individual members who are residents and
taxpayers of the State of Utah including Salt Lake City and
Salt Lake County.
3.

J. Walker is a resident of the County of Salt Lake.

J. Walker is a taxpayer and has for many years paid various
taxes (income, sales, etc.) to the State of Utah, Salt Lake
Count and Salt Lake City.
4. Richard Andrews is a resident of the County of Salt
Lake.

Richard Andrews is a taxpayer and has for many years

paid various taxes (income, property, sales, etc.) to the
State of Utah, Salt Lake County and Salt Lake City*

Richard

Andrews has personally and on behalf of the Society of
Separationists, Inc. protested to the Salt Lake City Council
against their practice of prayers before City Council
meetings. Richard Andrews is Co-Chair of the Utah Chapter of
the Society of Separationists, Inc.
5.

The defendants RONALD WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS,

NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and TOM
2

HALE, are the duly elected and serving members of the Salt
Lake City Council.

APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
6.

Art. I, § 4, of the Utah Constitution provides in

pertinent part:
. . . The State shall make no law
respecting an establishment of
religion . . . There shall be no
union of Church and State, nor shall
any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions. No
public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any
religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or for the support of any
ecclesiastical establishment.

CAUSE OF ACTION
7.

For several years and currently, the defendants

conduct prayers at the commencement of the meetings of the
Salt Lake City Council.
8.

The prayer recited at the commencement of the

September 10, 1991 Salt Lake City Council meeting by a
Chaplain of the Salt Lake City Police Department.
prayer was as follows:
Our Father in Heaven,
this night to be able
forum and we ask Thee
who participate, that

we are grateful
to meet in this
to bless those
their minds will

That

be clear and decisions will be made
that will be fair and equitable to the
citizens of the city. We are grateful
for our government. We are grateful
for the land we hold. Father, we are
grateful for the safe return of our
troops from the Gulf. We ask these
blessings in the name of Jesus Christ.
Amen.
9.

Although requested orally and in writing to cease

said practice, the defendants have declined to do so.
10.

The defendants' inclusion of prayers in City

Council meetings results in the expenditure of public funds,
assets and resources of Salt Lake City Corporation.

City

facilities (meeting rooms, etc.), city equipment
(microphones, podiums, stages, etc.), city resources
(electricity, printing of programs, etc.) and city employees'
time (in supervising, attending, etc.) are used and expended
in programming, witnessing, and/or reciting said prayers.
Said funds, assets and resources of Salt Lake City
Corporation are utilized to aid in the recitation of said
prayers with the knowledge, approval, concurrence and
ratification of the defendants.
11.

The allowance and/or inclusion of prayers in City

Council meetings results in the expenditure and application
of public funds, assets and resources of the defendant for
religious worship and exercise.

4

12.

The plaintiffs believe that unless enjoined and

restrained by this Court, the defendants will continue to
expend public funds as set forth above in violation of Art.
I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.
13.

The actions of the defendants in allowing prayers

in the past and in the future as set forth above was and will
be in violation of the provisions of Art. I# § 4 of the Utah
Constitution.
14.

Pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq (1953

as amended) the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory
judgment to the effect that the expenditure by the defendants
of City funds and resources for said prayers is in violation
of the provisions of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.
15.

The plaintiffs are entitled to a permanent

injunction to end the expenditure by the defendants of funds
and resources for said prayers is in violation of the provisions of Art. I, S 4 of the Utah Constitution.

RELIEF
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs request the following relief:
1.

A preliminary and a permanent injunction against

the defendants, their agents and employees prohibiting them

5

from expending any public funds, resources or property in
support of prayers at City Council meetings.
2.

A preliminary and a permanent injunction against

the defendants, their agents and employees prohibiting them
from allowing or having prayers at City Council meetings.
3.
as

Pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq (1953

amended), a declaratory judgment to the effect that the

past expenditure by the defendants of funds and the use of
its resources as set forth above was in violation of the
provisions of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.
4.

Plaintiffs should be awarded their costs incurred

herein and such other and further relief as the Court deems
just and proper in the premises.
DATED this 26th day of SEPTEMBER, 1991.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

BRIAN fL. BARNARD

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing COMPLAINT to:
ROGER CUTLER
Attorney for Defendants
SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY
SALT LAKE CITY & COUNTY BUILDING
WASHINGTON SQUARE
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on the 26TH day of SEPTEMBER, 1991, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

BMB/SOSSLC. C0M/LIT3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS,
INC., a Maryland non-profit
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS;
and J. WALKER,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. 910906136

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake
City Council,
Defendants.

The parties have filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment
in the instant action.

Plaintiffs seek a declaration from this

Court that the City Councils practice of including, for a
number of stated secular purposes, a prayer as part of its
opening

ceremonies, violates Article

I,

Section

4

of the

Constitution of the State of Utah.
This Court, on January 13, 1992, granted the Motion for
Leave to File Amicus Brief on behalf of the American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation of Utah, Inc.
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arguments
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the
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motions

were

heard

February 21, 1991.

OPERATIVE FACTS
1.
and

The 1911 Utah State Legislature merged the legislative

executive

functions

of

commission form of government.

the

city

government

into

a

Prayer was not usually offered

during these meetings for the years 1911 through 1979.
2.

In 1980, pursuant to Title 10-3-1701, et seq.f Utah

Code Ann., 1953, Salt Lake City adopted the Council-Strong
Mayor form of government.
separates

the

executive

This form of government strictly
and

legislative

functions.

The

executive functions are carried out solely by the mayor, with
the legislative functions reserved to the City Council.
3.

At its first meeting on January 8, 1980, the City

Council decided to open the meeting with a ceremony which
included the Pledge of Allegiance and a prayer.

From January

15, 1980 until October 15, 1987, the proceedings of the City
Council reflect that a prayer or invocation was usually offered
at the beginning of each weekly legislative meeting.
4.

In a letter dated September 23, 1987, Assistant City

Attorney Ray Montgomery offered an opinion to the City Council
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Chambers,

including

463

U.S.

prayerful

783

(1983) ,

invocations

were

constitutionally permissible.
5.

Beginning

on

May

17,

1988,

the

City

Council

reinstituted the practice of including prayers as part of the
opening ceremonies of the Council meetings.

Prayers were not

said before the Salt Lake City Council from October 15, 1987
through May 17, 1988.

Defendants acknowledge that the practice

of the City Council from 1980 to 1987 was to have prayers and
invocations.
6.

On

October

17,

1991,

the

Salt

Lake

City

Council

adopted the Opening Ceremony Policy by a vote of 5 to 2.
7.
as part

The formally adopted City Council Policy provides that
of an opening

ceremony, the City Council will hear

various thoughts, readings and invocations prior to beginning
certain legislative sessions.

Contrary to the formally adopted

City Council Policy, at least two of the defendant City Council
members

acknowledge

that

prayers

and

invocations

before the

City Council have always been offered and will continue to be
offered for religious purposes.
specifies that the offering
invocations

is

for

a

Yet, the City Council Policy

of these thoughts, readings and

number

of

secular

purposes.

These

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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specified secular purposes include the provision of a moment
during which the Council members and the audience can reflect
on the business

before

the

Council; the promotion

of an

atmosphere of civility; the encouragement of lofty thought and
high-mindedness; the recognition of cultural diversity; and the
fostering of sensitivity for and recognition of the uniqueness
of all segments of our community.
8.

The

Council

non-denominational
presentations.

Policy

and

expresses

a

non-proselyting

Presentation

of

the

preference

opening

opening

ceremony

ceremony

coordinated by the Salt Lake City Police Chaplain.

for

is

Pursuant to

the Policy, anyone not contacted by the Chaplain can make
arrangements

to

give

their

opening

presentation.

The

presenters are not compensated in any way.
9.

Salt Lake City employee, Ed Snow, spent two days in

the fall of 1990 making telephone calls to sign up people that
would

offer

indicated

prayers

at

the

that the City has

City

Council

meetings.

an extensive mailing

He

list of

churches which was used to invite religious leaders to contact
the City to offer prayers.
10.
City

Defendant Council member Godfrey acknowledges that the

Council,s

desire and

goal

prayers has not been successful.

to have

non-denominational

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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Pace

on

October 17,

with regard to the defendant's recently
fl

Policy regarding prayer before City Council meetings,
believe

that

what

we're

doing

[offering

prayers]

enacted
I don't

could

be

construed as secular and I don't believe that would hold up in
court."
12.

On

September

10,

1991, the Salt

Lake

City

Council

allowed the recitation of the following prayer by the Chaplain
of the Salt Lake City Police Department:
Our Father in Heaven, we are grateful this
night to be able to meet in this forum and
we ask Thee to bless those who participate,
that their minds will be clear and decisions
will be made that will be fair and equitable
to the citizens of the City.
We are
grateful
for
our
government.
We
are
grateful for the land we hold. Father, we
are grateful for the safe return of our
troops
from
the
Gulf.
We
ask
these
blessings in the name of Jesus Christ. Amen.
13.

Although requested orally and in writing to cease said

practice, the defendants have declined to do so.
14.

Defendants

admit

that

"existing

city

facilities,

assets and a small amount of time" are used in conducting the
invocations.
results

in

The inclusion of prayers in City Council meetings
the

expenditure

of

public

funds,

assets

and

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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used

and

facilities

(microphones, podiums,

(electricity,

and City employees7 time
are

City

expended

witnessing and/or reciting said prayers.

printing

of

(in supervising,
in

programming,

Said funds, assets

and resources of Salt Lake City Corporation are utilized to aid
in the recitation of said prayers with the knowledge, approval,
concurrence and ratification of the defendants.

ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs

have

sought

Summary

Judgment

against

the

defendants seeking to enjoin the presentation of prciyers and
invocations as part of the Salt Lake City Council meetings in
that the same constitutes an expenditure and appropriation by
defendants

of

funds

and

resources

in

violation

of

the

prohibitory provisions of Article I, Section 4 of the Utah
Constitution.

Specifically, it is argued the Utah Constitution

establishes the right of citizens to have no public money spent
on a religious exercise, the right to a government free of
sectarian influence or control, and the right to entertain
their own religious ideas free of state intrusions.

These

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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of

religious
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absolute

separation

of

church and state explicitly go beyond those protections offered
by the United States Constitution.

In expanding the rights of

its citizens, the Utah Constitution it is argued, distinctly
and

separately

rejects

the

practice

of

praying

before

legislative meetings.
Defendants have responded by arguing that notwithstanding
the differences in the language of the Utah Constitution to
that of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,
this Court should decide the issue presented the way it has
been decided by the United States Supreme Court in the matter
of

Marsh

v.

traditional

Chambers,
prayers

463

are,

U.S.

783

under

(1983),

specified

in

that

such

circumstances,

acceptable under the First Amendment and do not constitute an
establishment of religion.

It is argued by the defendants that

the offering of non-denominational, non-proselyting prayers for
specified

secular

purposes

at

"legislative"

sessions

is

acceptable under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of
Utah.

Furthermore,

it

is

argued,

the

expenditures

are

de

minimus.
Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution in pertinent
part declares:

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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The rights of conscience shall never be
infringed.
The state shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof;. . .
There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State, or
interfere with its functions. No public
money or property shall be appropriated for
or applied
to any religious worship,
exercise or instruction, or for the support
of any ecclesiastical establishment. . . .
No

prior

Utah

Supreme

Court

cases

have

specifically

interpreted the foregoing constitutional provision insofar as
it relates to the exercise or the allowance of prayers and/or
invocations at city council or legislative meetings.

Moreover,

none of the cases cited by counsel are specifically on point.
However, while not of precedential value, it is instructive to
examine

decisions

from

other

state

courts

which

have

interpreted comparable provisions of their own constitutions.
Article I, Section 5, of the Oregon Constitution states:
No money shall be drawn from the treasury
for the benefit of any religeous [sic] or
theological institution, nor shall any money
be appropriated for the payment of any
religeous [sic] services in either house of
the Legislative assembly.

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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by

the

Oregon

Court

of

Appeals in the matter of Kay v. Douglas School District, 719
P.2d

875

(Or.App.

prohibition
strictly,

of public

finding

it

public school had
time.

1986).

The

Oregon

court

interpreted

expenditure on religious

applicable

the

institutions

even though a teacher

in a

scheduled to read a prayer on volunteered

The court held, as follows:
The fact that money spent on the preparation
and delivery of the invocation was not
apportioned and identified as a "line item"
in the budget does not take it out of the
proscription of Section 5, which prohibits
the spending of any money for the benefit
of any religious or theological institution.
Id. at 878. (Emphasis original)

In the matter of Sands v. Moronao Unified School District,
809

P.2d

809,

at

836

(Cal.

1991),

three

members

California Supreme Court determined that governmental

of

the

support

and endorsement of graduation prayers violated both the state
and federal constitutions.
They refused to find the supposed "sectarian" nature of the
prayers

acceptable,

unconstitutional

"when

insisting

that

a

it appears to place the

practice

is

government's

stamp of approval on a particular type of religious practice,

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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Article XVI, Section 5,

of the California Constitution provides:
Neither the Legislature, nor any county,
city and county, township, school district,
or other municipal corporation, shall ever
make an appropriation, or pay from any
public fund whatever, or grant anything to
or in aid of any religious sect, church,
creed, or sectarian purpose. . . .
Judge Mosk, concurring, stated that,
and

should

be, the

liberties....11

first

Id. at 836.

line

lf

[S]tate courts are

of defense

for

individual

Two additional judges of the

California Supreme Court having concurred in the finding that
the practice

involved violated

the First Amendment of the

United States Constitution, declined to reach the issue of
whether or not the practice involved violated the California
Constitution.

The remaining two judges determined there was no

violation.
Clearly, the pertinent provisions in the Utah Constitution
in question, have no counterparts in the federal constitution,
and are not intended to be restricted by interpretations of the
United States Constitution.

Instead, as asserted by the Utah

Supreme Court, the state constitution embodies certain of the
provisions of the federal constitution, and then expands and
expounds on these in greater detail:
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PAGE 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[P]rovision of Section 4, Article I, of the
Utah Constitution. . . is more articulate
and express in assuring religious liberty
and prohibiting discrimination, or church
interference with private or public rights,
than the generality of the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution.
Manning v. Sevier County. 517 P.2d 549, at
552 (Utah 1973) (Crockett, J., concurring).
One scholar has observed:
Compared to the brief and almost
enigmatic statement on religion in the
federal
constitution,
the
Utah
constitution's
provisions
seem
prolix
indeed. Almost every imaginable protection
for religious freedom and injunction against
the union of church and state has been
included.
[T]he union of church and state is
expressly prohibited. . . and appropriations
of public money or property to "any
religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical
establishment" are proscribed.
Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State
Constitution, Utah L.Rev. 326, at 331 (1966).
One of the principal, if not the first canon of statutory
or constitutional construction is that if the language of a
statute or constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous,
examination of legislative intent is unnecessary.

In Rampton

v. Barlow. 464 P.2d 378 (Utah 1970), the Supreme Court held
that if the language of a statute or constitutional provision
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intent

was

necessary*

w

[I]ntent is to be found from the instrument itself;

and when

the text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the
courts, in giving construction thereto, are not at liberty to
search

for

its meaning beyond

the

instrument."

Hines

v.

Winters. 320 P.2d 1114 (Okla. 1957)e
To get at the thought or meaning expressed
in a statute. ..or a Constitution, the first
resort, in all cases, is to the natural
signification of the words.... If the words
convey a definite meaning which involves no
absurdity, nor any contradiction of other
parts of the instrument, then that meaning,
apparent on the face of the instrument, must
be accepted and neither the courts nor the
Legislature have the right to add to it or
take from it.
Shaw v. Grumbie. 278 P. 311 (Okla. 1929)
Where there exists no ambiguity in the language of the
document to be interpreted, and the interpretation therefore is
not doubtful, there is little reason to resort to factors
outside the words themselves for the meaning of the provision.
In this instance, the constitutional provision in question
is

unambiguous

and

capable

of

ready

interpretation.

The

unequivocal, unconditional pronouncements of Article I, Section
4 leave little room for clarification and interpretation.
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to make every

reasonable

presumption in favor of constitutionality, and this Court will
not

nullify

expressly

legislative

prohibited

by

enactments

unless

the Constitution.

it

is

Utah

clear
Farm

and

Bureau

Ins. Co. v, Utah Insurance Guaranty Assoc, 564 P.2d 751, 753
(Utah 1977).

A legislative enactment is presumed to be valid

and in conformity with the constitution.
decision,

the

defendants7

adopted

For purposes of this

Policy

is

treated

"legislative" action, though there is some doubt.

as

It should

not be held to be invalid unless it has been shown beyond a
reasonable

doubt

to

be

constitutional provision.

incompatible

with

some

particular

Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d

1035, 1037 (Utah 1975), cert, den., 425 U.S. 915 (1976).
The

language

of

absolute law which

the

Utah

Constitution

Utah governmental

sets

forth

the

officials are bound to

follow.
By encouraging, supporting, allowing or condoning religious
worship

before

non-secular

its

sessions,

entanglements.

By

the

Council

planning

for

is

enmeshed

and

in

presenting

public prayers as part of their opening ceremonies, the City
Council

uses public

practice of prayer.

funds to aid

and

support the

religious

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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Government prayer does involve the expenditure of public
funds.

The City Council has spent time and money to develop

guidelines for those offering invocations.

The Council members

and City employees are paid to observe and be solemnized by the
exercise.

City employees must schedule and arrange for the

attendance

of

the

person

offering

prayer.

Moreover,

the

facilities intended for use of the City are appropriated for
the actual presentation of prayer.

Such expenditures contrary

to the argument of defendants, are not de minimus, but on the
contrary,

represent

protected rights.

a

serious

threat

to

constitutionally

The Constitution of Utah dictates in clear

and bold terms that religious exercise must be separate from
the functions of government.
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in
the Memoranda in support of the plaintifffs requested relief,
the

plaintiff's

Summary

Judgment

is

granted

as

prayed.

Defendant's cross Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Counsel for plaintiffs is to prepare the appropriate Orders.
Dated this

f» ^^av of March, 1992,
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the
this

foregoing

Memorandum

Decision,

day of March, 1992:

Brian M. Barnard
Attorney for Plaintiffs
214 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204
Kathryn D. Kendell
Attorney for ACLU
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

M. David Eckersley
Co-counsel for ACLU
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bruce R. Baird
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Defendant
451 S. State, Suite 505
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

to the

following,

NU
APR

Q jscg

UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB #0215
JOHN PACE
USB # 5624
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

&\n2£P%
SOCIETY OF
SEPARATIONISTS, INC.,
a Maryland non-profit
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS;
and J. WALKER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

....

ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No, 91-090-6136 CV

RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake
City Council
Defendants.

(Hon. J.D. FREDERICK)

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court
for hearing on February 21, 1992 on the parties7 mutual
motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs being represented by
Brian M. Barnard and defendants being represented by Roger
Cutler, the Court having reviewed the file and all of the
pleadings therein, the matter having been argued and
submitted and the court now being fully advised in the

premises, based upon the facts and reasoning set out in
plaintiffs' memoranda and in the Court's Memorandum Decision
of March 2, 1992, there being no substantial material facts
in dispute,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
defendants' motion for summary judgment should be and hereby
is denied; further,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be and hereby
is granted; further,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
plaintiffs are entitled to and are hereby granted a
declaratory judgment to the effect that the past expenditures
of funds by defendants and the use of City resources in
support of prayers at City Council meetings and the practice
of defendants and Salt Lake City in having or allowing
prayers to be recited at meetings of the Salt Lake City
Council violate Art, I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution;
further,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
defendants, their agents and employees are hereby permanently
prohibited and enjoined from allowing or having prayers
recited at meetings of the Salt Lake City Council and they
2

are permanently enjoined and prohibited from expending public
funds, resources or property to support or encourage such
prayers; further,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
plaintiffs are awarded a judgment against defendants for
plaintiffs' court costs incurred in this matter in the sum of
one hundred three dollars ($103.00).
DATED this

Of « M « , 1992.
BY TH2 COTOT:

QEP'STl'C

3
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UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB #0215
JOHN PACE
USB #5624
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

SOCIETY OF
SEPARATIONISTS, INC.,
a Maryland non-profit
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS;
and J. WALKER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

STATE OF UTAH

ORDER RE: POST
DECISION MATTERS
Civil No. 91-090-6136 CV

RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake
City Council
Defendants.

(Hon. J.D. FREDERICK)

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court
on the defendants' Motion for Clarification and defendants'
Objection to the Proposed Summary Judgment Order submitted by
plaintiff, the Court having reviewed the arguments, the file
and the pleadings therein and being fully advised in the
premises, based thereon and for good cause appearing and for
the reasons set out in plaintiffs' reply memorandums,

-

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
defendants' Motion for Clarification of the Court's ruling
and memorandum decision of March 2, 1992 should be and hereby
is denied; further,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
defendants/ Objections to the proposed Summary Judgment Order
should be and hereby are overruled; said Summary Judgment
Order was signed and entered by the Court on April 9, 1992.
DATED this

day of APRIL, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

J. DENNIS FREDERICK
JUDGE

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER RE:

POST DECISION

MATTERS to:
ROGER CUTLER & BRUCE BAIR2
Attorneys for Defendants
SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEYS
SALT LAKE CITY & COUNTY BUILDING
WASHINGTON SQUARE
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
KATHRYN KENDELL
STAFF COUNSEL
ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS
THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION FOUNDATION OF UTAH, INC.
BOSTON BUILDING
#419
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
on the 15TH day of APRIL, 1992, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW:
LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND
DEFENSES

JENNIFER FRTESEN
Professor of Law
Loyola Law School
Los Angeles, California

1992

Matthew Bender
* m Time* Mirror
M Book*

App. 4A. State Texts Relating to Religion1
Research Note:
State constitutions treat religion much more specifically and elaborately than do the comparatively terse free exercise and establishment
clauses of the federal first amendment. Indiana has seven clauses
relevant to freedom of religion and conscience in its Bill of Rights
alone. Particularized state provisions include, among many others,
clauses making bigamy and polygamy a crime (Idaho Const, art. I,
§ 4; Okla. Const, art. I, § 2) and Wisconsin's clause on the public
transportation of children to and from parochial schools (Wis. Const,
art. I, § 21). The Louisiana and Montana Bills of Rights even prohibit
non-governmental discrimination against religious beliefs or ideas (La.
Const, art I, § 12; Mont Const, art. n, § 4).
The researcher should not limit the search to a state's Bill of Rights
alone. State constitutional limitations on financial aid to religion or
sectarian schools, for example, are often placed outside of the Bill
of Rights, in sections relating to public finance or to education.
Miscellaneous provisions touching upon religion may be scattered
throughout the constitution, including in its preamble.
Finally, some state clauses, if literally applied, are likely inconsistent
with interpretations of the first amendment. See. e.g., Md. Decl. of
Rights arts. 36, 37 (disqualifying atheists from public office) and
Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S. Ct. 1680, 6 L. Ed. 2d 982
(1961) (exclusion from public office of persons who did not believe
in Supreme Being violated federal Constitution); Miss. Const, art. 3,
§ 18 (use of Bible in public schools permitted); Va. Const. artc I, § 16
("[I]t is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love,
and charity toward each other."); Vt. Const. Ch. I, art. 3 (observance
of Sabbath); see also Walter v. West Virginia, 610 R Supp. 1169 (S.D.
W. Va. 1985) (constitutional amendment XVa, requiring moment of
silence at beginning of school day, violated the first amendment).
1

These tables build on citations collected in Fritz, Religion in a Federal System:
Diversity Versus Uniformity, 38 Kan. L. Rev. 39 (1989); Collins, Bills and Declarations of Rights Digest, in The Amencan Bench 2500 (3d ed. 1985/1986), and other
sources.
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L PROHIBITIONS ON ESTABLISHMENT AND
PREFERENCE
A. Representative Clauses:
1. "The state shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.*'
Mont. Const, art. II, § 5.
2. "There shall be no establishment of one religious sect in preference to another."
N.J. Const, art. 1, § 4.
3. "No preference shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious
society, or mode of worship; and no person shall be compelled to
attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any
ministry, against his consent."
Ind. Const, art. I, § 4 (as amended 1984).
B. State by State Listings:
1. Establishment clause similar to federal.
Ala. Const, art. I, § 3;
Alaska Const, art. 1, § 4;
Cal. Cons' »* 1. § 4;
Fla. Const, art. I, § 2;
Haw. Const, art. I, § 4;
Iowa Const art. I, § 3;
La. Const, art. I, § 8;
Md. Decl. of Rights art. 36, cl. 3 (ambiguous, as not addressed by
legislation);
Mont. Const, art. n, § 5;
S.C. Const, art. I, § 2;
Utah Const, art. I, § 4.
2. No-preference Clause.
Ala. Const, art I, § 3;
Aric. Const, art. II, § 24;
(Manhew Bender & Co., Inc)
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Cal. Const, art. 1, § 4;
Colo. Const, art. n, § 4;
Conn. Const, art. VII, cl. 2;
Del. Const, art. I, § 1;
Idaho Const, art. I, § 4;
El. Const, art. I, § 3;
Ind. Const, art. I, § 4;
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 7;
Ky. Const. Bill of Rights § 5;
Me. Const, arte I, § 3;
Mass. Const, amend., art. XI;
Minn. Const, art. I, § 16;
Miss. Const, art. 3, § 18;
Mo. Const, art I, § 7;
Neb. Const, art. I, § 4;
N.H. Const, pt. 1, art. 6;
NJ. Const, art. I, § 4;
N.M. Const, art. n, § 11;
N.Y. Const, art. I, § 3;
Nev< Const, art. 1, § 4;
N.D. Const, art. 1, § 3;
Ohio Const, art. I, § 7;
Pa. Const, art. I, § 3;
S.D. Const, art. VI, § 3;
Tenn. Const, art. I, § 3;
Tex. Const, art. I, § 6;
Va. Const, art. I, § 16;
W. Va. Const, art. m, § 15;
Wis. Const, art. I, § 18;
Wyo. Const, art. I, § 18.
3. Neither an Establishment Qause nor a No-preference Clause.
(Matthew Bender & Co.. Inc.)
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Arizona
Georgia
Michigan
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode 1:1^:
Vermont
Washington
4. Ban on religious or sectarian control of publicly funded schools,
or religious indoctrination in public schools.
Alaska Const, art. VII, § 1;
Ariz. Const, art XX, § 7;
Cal.
Const, art. K, §§ 8, 9(f);
Colo. Const, art. IX, § 8;
Haw. Const, art. X, § 1;
Idaho Const, art. IX, § 6;
Kan. Const, art. 6, § 6(c);
Mont. Const, art. X, § 7;
Neb. Const, art. VII, § 11;
Nev. Const, art. 11, §§ 2, 9;
N.M. Const, art. XH, § 3;
N.D. Const art. VIE, § 5;
Ohio Const, art VI, § 2;
Okla. Const, art. I, § 5;
S.D. Const, art. Vm, § 16;
Utah Const, art. HI, c. 4;
Wash. Const, art. IX, § 4;
Wis. Const, art. X, § 6;
Wyo. Const, art. 7, § 12.
(Matthew Bender &. Co, Inc)
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5. Clauses accommodating religion in public schools or allowing for
release of students to study during school hours.
Mich. Const, art. Vm, § 1;
Miss. Const, art. 3, § 18;
Neb. Const, art. I, § 4;
N.C. Const, art. DC, § 1;
Ohio Const, art. I, § 7;
Wis. Const, art. X, § 3.
II. NO FINANCIAL AID TO RELIGION
A. Representative Clauses:
1. " . . . No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or
agency thereof shall ever be paid from the public treasury directly or
indirectly in aid on any church, sect, or religious denomination or in
aid of any sectarian institution."
Fla. Const, art. I, § 3.
2. "Neither the Legislature, nor any county, city and county, township, school district, or other municipal corporation, shall ever make
an appropriation, or pay from any public fund whatever, or grant
anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian
purpose . . .."
Cal. Const, art. XVI, § 5.
3. "All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the
public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence."
Wash. Const, art. IX, § 4.
B. State by State Listings:
1. I>u compulsory individual contributions (support).
Ala. Const art. I, § 3;
Ark. Const, art. II, § 24;
Cal. Const, art. XVI, § 5; art. K , § 8;
Colo. Const, art. II, § 4;
Conn. Const, art. VH, cl. 1;
(Matthew Bender A Co., Inc)
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Del. Const, art. I, § 1;
Idaho Const, art. I, § 4;
111. Const, art. I, § 3;
Ind. Const, art. 1, § 4;
Iowa Const, art. I, § 3;
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 7;
Ky. Const. § 5;
Md. Bill of Rights, Decl. of Rights, art. 36, cl. 1;
Mich. Const, art. I, § 4;
Minn. Const, art. I, § 16;
Mo. Const, art. I, § 6;
Neb. Const art. I, § 4;
N.H. Const, pt. I, art. 6;
NJ. Const, art. I, § 3;
N.M. Const, art. H, § 11;
Ohio Const, art. I, § 7;
Pa. Const, art. I, § 3;
R.I. Const, art. I, § 3;
S.D. Const, art. VI, § 3;
Tenn. Const, art. I, § 3;
Tex. Const, art. I, § 6;
Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 3;
Va. Const, art. I, § 16;
W. Va. Const, art m, § 15;
Wis. Const art. I, § 18.
2. No gifts, funds or appropriations to churches, religious schools,
or religious institutions.
Ala. Const, art. XIV, § 263;
Alaska Const, art. VII, § 1;
Ariz. Const, art. II, § 12;
Cal. Const, art. DC, § 8;
(Matthew Bender & CoM Ioc)
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Colo. Const art. DC, § 7;
Del. Const, art. X, § 3;
Fla. Const, art. I, § 3;
Gz. Const, art. I, § 2;
Haw. Const, art. X, § 1;
Idaho Const, art. K, § 5;
111. Const, art. X, § 3;
Ind. Const, art. 1, § 6;
Kan. Const, art. 6, § 6(c);
Ky. Const. § 189;
Mass. Const amend, art. XVm, § 2;
Mich. Const art. Vm, § 2;
Minn. Const art. XDI, § 2;
Miss. Const, art. 8, § 208;
Mo. Const art. K, § 8;
Mont Const, art. X, § 6(1);
Neb. Const, art VII, § 11;
N.H. Const pt II, art. 83;
N.M. Const art. XII, § 3;
N.Y. Const, art. XI, § 3;
N.D. Const art. Vm, § 5;
Or. Const, art. I, § 5;
Pa. Const art. m, § 15;
S.C. Const art. XI, § 4;
SJD. Const art. VHIf § 16;
Tex. Const, art. VII, § 5;
Utah Const art X, § 9;
Va. Const art Vm, § 10;
Wash. Const art. I, § 11, art. IX § 4;
Wyo. Const art. VE, § 8.
3. Exemption for transportation, textbooks, or tuition loans or grants.
(Manhew Bender & C o . Inc.)
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Colo. Const, art. XI, § 2a (loans);
Del. Const, art. X, § 5 (transportation);
La. Const, art. VIE, § 13 (textbooks);
Mich. Ccr : art viU, § 2 (transportation);
NJ. Const, an. vill, § 4, fl (transportation);
N.Y. Const, art. XI, § 3 (transportation);
Wis. Const, art. 1, § 23 (transportation);
Va. Const, art. VIII, § 11 (loans or grants).
4. No religious control of public educational funding.
Kan.

Bill of Rights art. 6, § 6;

Miss. Const, art. 8, § 208;
Ohio Const, art. VI, § 2.
HI. FREEDOM OF EXERCISE, WORSHIP, AND
CONSCIENCE
A. Representative Clauses:
1. "That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience; that
no man can of right be compelled to attend . . . any place of worship
. . .; that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or
interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall
ever be given, by law, to any religious establishment or mode of
worship."
Tenn. Const, art. I, § 3.
2. "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination, shall forever hereafter be guaranteed,
and no person shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege
or capacity, on account of his opinions concerning religion; but the
liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense
with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness, or to justify
practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of the state.
No person shall be required to attend or support any ministry or place
of worship, religious sect, or denomination against his consent. Nor
shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomination
or mode of worship."
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.)
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Colo, Const, art. n, § 4.
3. "Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious
sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual,
and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on
account of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall
not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state . . .."
Wash. Const, art. I, § 11.
B. State by State Listing:
1, Generally securing toleration of religious sentiment
Ariz. Const, art XX, cl. 1;
Idaho Const art. XXI, § 19;
Nev. Const ordinance, cl. 2;
NJil Const, art. XXI, § 1;
NJD. Const art. Xm, § 1;
Okla. Const, art I, § 2;
SX>. Const art XXVI, § 18, cl. 1;
Utah Const art. m, § 1;
Wash. Const art. XXVI, § 1;
Wyo, Const art. 21, § 25.
2. No molestation in person or property for religious opinion.
Ga. Const art I, § 1, f IV;
Idaho Const art. XXI, § 19;
Me. Const, art. I, § 3;
Mass. Const, pt I, art. II;
N.H. Const, pt. I, art 5;
N.M. Const art. II, § 11;
Okla. Const, art. I, § 2;
R.I. Const, art. I, § 3;
Va. Const art I, § 16;
Wash. Const art. I, § 11;
(Matthew Bender & Co., b e )
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W. Va. Const, art. ffl, § 15.
3.

Right to worship according to dictates of conscience.

Ark. Const, art. II, § 24;
Conn. Const, art. VII;
Ga. Const, art I, § 1,1 m
Ind. Const, an. 1, § 2;
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 7;
Me. Const, art. I, § 3;
Mass. Const, pt. I, art. II;
Mich. Const, art. I, § 4;
Minn. Const, art. I, § 16;
Mo. Const, art. I, § 5;
Neb. Const, art. I, § 4;
N.H. Const, pt. I, art 5;
NJ. Const, art. I, § 3;
N.M. Const, art. II, § 11;
N.C. Const, art. I, § 13;
Ohio Const art. I, § 7;
Or. Const, art. I, § 2;
Pa. Const, art. I, § 3;
R.I. Const art. I, § 3;
S.D. Const, art. VI, § 3;
Tenn. Const, art. I, § 3;
Tex. Const, art. I, § 6;
Utah Const, art. I, § 4;
Vt Const, ch. I, art. 3;
Va. Const, art I, § 16;
Wash. Const art. I, § 11;
Wis. Const, art I, § 18.
4. Freedom of "conscience" from official interference (some raise
ambiguity whether secular conscience, in addition to religious conscience, is protected).
(Matthew Bender & Co-
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Ariz. Const, art. n, § 12;
Ark. Const, art. n, § 24;
Cal. Const, art. I, § 4;
Colo. Const, art. n, § 4;
Del Const, art. I, § 1;
Ga. Const, art I, § I, \ HI;
Idaho Const, art. I, § 4;
111. Const, art. I, § 3;
Ind. Const, art. 1, § 3;
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 7;
Ky. Const. Bill of Rights §§ 1, 5;
Me. Const, art. I, § 3;
Mass. Const, pt. I, art. II;
Mich. Const, art. I, § 4;
Minn. Const, art I, § 16;
Mo. Const, art. I, § 5;
Neb. Const, art. I, § 4;
Nev. Const, art. 1, § 4;
N.H. Const, pt. I, arts. 4, 5;
NJ. Const, art. I, § 3;
N.M. Const, art H, § 11, and art. XXI, § 1;
N.Y. Const, art. I, § 3;
N.C. Const, art. I, § 13;
N.D. Const, art. I, § 3;
Ohio Const, art. I, § 7;
Okla. Const, art. I, § 2;
Or. Const, art. I, § 3;
Pa. Const, art. I, § 3;
R.I. Const, art. I, § 3;
S.D. Const, art. VI, § 3;
Tenn. Const, art. I, § 3;
(Matthew Bender * C o . Inc.)
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Tex. Const, art. I, § 6;
Utah Const, art. I, § 4;
Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 3;
Va. Const, art. I, § 16;
Wash. Const, art. I, § 11;
Wis. Const, art. I, § 18;
Wyo. Const, art. i, § 18.
5. Forbidding discrimination against free exercise of religion, or
based on religion.
Ala. Const, art. I, § 3;
Alaska Const, art. I, § 3;
Cal Const, art. I, § 4;
Colo. Const, art II, § 4;
Conn. Const, art. I, § 20;
Ha. Const, art. I, § 2;
Ga. Const, art. I, § 1,1 IV;
Haw. Const, art. I, § 5;
Idaho Const, art. I, § 4;
HI. Const, art. I, § 3;
I?wa Const, art. I, § 4;
K>. Const. § 5;
La. Const art. I, § 3;
Me. Const, art. I, § 3;
Md. Decl. of Rights art. 36, cl. 1;
Mich. Const art. I, § 2;
Mont. Const, art. n, § 4;
Nev. Const, art. 1, § 4;
NJ. Const art. I, § 5;
N.M. Const, art. II, § 11;
N.Y. Const art. I, § 3;
N.C. Const, art. I, § 19;
(Manbew Bender & Co- Inc)
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N.D. Const, art. I, § 3;
Okla. Const, art. I, § 2;
Or. Const, art. I, § 3;
R.I. Const, art. I, § 3;
S.D. Const, art. VI, § 3;
Tex. Const, art. I, § 3a;
Utah Const art. HI, cl. 1;
Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 3;
Va. Const, art, I, § 16;
Wash, Const, art. XXVI, cl. 1;
W. Va. Const, art. m, § 15;
Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 18.
6. Free exercise clause similar to federal.
Alaska Const, art. I, § 4;
Fla. Const art. I, § 3;
Haw. Const, art. I, § 4;
Iowa Const, art. I, § 3;
La. Const, art. I, § 8;
Mass. Const, amend, art. XVm, § 1;
Mont. Const, art. n, § 5;
S.C. Const art. 1, § 2;
Utah Const art. 1, § 4.
7. Rights to refrain—no one compelled to attend a place of worship.
Ala. Const art. I, § 3;
Ark. Const, art. II, § 24;
Colo. Const, art. II, § 4;
Conn. Const art. VII;
Del. Const, art. I, § 1;
Idaho Const, art. I, § 4 and art. K , § 6;
HI. Const, art. I, § 3;
Ind. Const, art. 1, § 4;
(Mashew Bender & Co., Inc.)
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Iowa Const, art. I, § 3;
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 7;
Ky. Const. Bill of Rights, § 5;
Md. Decl of Rights, art. 36, cl. 1;
Mass. Const. Decl. of Rights, art. II;
Mich. Const, art. I, § 4;
Minn. Const, art. I, § 16;
Mo. Const, art. I, § 6;
Neb. Const, art. I, § 4;
NJ. Const, art. n, § 3;
N.M. Const, art. H, § 11;
Ohio Const, art. I, § 7;
Pa. Const, art. I, § 3;
R.I. Const, art. I, § 3;
S.D. Const, art. VI, § 3;
Tenn. Const, art. I, § 3;
Tex. Const, art. I, § 6;
Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 3;
Va. Const, art. I, § 16;
W. Va. Const, art. HI, § 15;
Wis. Const, art. I, § 18.
8. Rights to refrain from participation in religious services in public
educational institutions.
Colo. Const, art. DC, § 8;
Idaho Const, art. DC, § 6;
Mont. Const, art. X, § 7;
N.M. Const, art. XII, § 9;
Wyo. Const, art. VII, § 12.
9. Exemption from state military duty on grounds of religious or
conscientious scruples.
Ark. Const, art. XI, § 1; (if federal law would exempt) Colo. Const
art. XVH, § 5;
(Matthew Bender & Co
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Fla. Const, art. X, § 2(a); (religious)
Idaho Const, art. XIV, § 1;
IlL Const, art. XII, § 1; (if federal law would exempt)
Ind. Const, art. 12, § 4; (conscientious objectors)
Iowa Const, art. VI, § 2;
Kan. Const, art. 8, § 1;
Ky. Const. § 220;
Me. Const, art. VH, § 5; (religious)
Mont. Const, art. VI, § 13(2); (if federal law would exempt)
N.H. Const, pt. I, art. 13;
N.M. Const, art. XVm, § 1; (if federal lav/ would exempt)
N.D. Const art. XI, § 16; (religious)
Or. Const, art X, § 2; (religious)
Pa. Const, art. m, § 16;
S.C. Const, art. XIII, § 1; (religious)
S.D. Const, art. XV, § 7;
Tenn. Const, art. I, § 28 and art. Vffl, § 3;
Tex. Const art. 16, § 47;
Utah Const, art. XV, § 1; (if federal law would exempt)
Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 9;
Wash. Const, art. X, § 6;
Wyo. Const, art. 17, § 1.
10. Religious exemption from state taxation.
Ala. Const, art. IV, § 91, art. XH, § 229;
Alaska Const, art. EX, § 4;
Ariz. Const art. DC, § 2(1);
Ark. Const, art. XVI, § 5;
Cal. Const art. XDI, §§ 3(f), 4(b);
Colo. Const, art. X, § 5;
Fla. Const, art. VII, § 3(a);
Ga. Const, art VII, § n, ^ 4;
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc)
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III. Const, art. IX, § 6;
Ind. Const, art. 10, § 1(a)(1);
Kan. Const, art. 11, §§ 1(a), 1(b)(2);
Ky. Const. § 170,
La. Const, art. VII, § 21(B)(1);
Mich. Const, art. DC, § 4;
Minn. Const, art. X, § 1;
Mo. Const, art. X, § 6;
Mont. Const, art. VHI, § 5(l)(b);
Neb. Const, art. Vm, § 2;
Nev. Const, art. 8, § 2 and art. 10, § 1, H 8;
NJ. Const, art. Vm, § 2;
N.M. Const, art. VHI, § 3;
N.Y. Const, art. XVI, § 1;
N.D. Const art. X, § 5;
Ohio Const, art. XII, § 2;
Okla. Const, art. X, § 6;
Pa. Const, art. Vm, § 2(a)(i);
S.C. Const, art. X, § 3(c);
S.D. Const, art. XI, § 6;
Tenn. Const, art. n, § 28;
Tex. Const, art. 8, § 2(a);
Utah Const, art. XIH, § 2(2)(c);
Va. Const, art. X, §§ 6(a)(2), 6(a)(6);
W. Va. Const, art. X, § 1;
Wyo. Const, art. 15, § 12.
IV. NO RELIGIOUS TESTS OR QUALIFICATIONS
A. Representative Clauses:
1. "No religious test or property qualification shall be required for
any office of public trust, nor for any vote at any election, nor shall
any person be incompetent to testify on account of religious belief."
(Mitthew Bender & C c Inc)
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Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, art. 7.
2. "No religious qualification shall be required for any public office
or employment, nor shall any person be incompetent .as a witness or
juror in consequence of his opinion on matters of religion, nor be
questioned touching his religious belief in any court of justice to affect
the weight of his testimony."
Ariz. Const, art. II, § 12.
3. "No person shall be disqualified to give evidence in any of the
Courts of this State on account of his religious opinions, or for the
want of any religious belief . . .."
Tex. Const, art. I, § 5.
4. ". . . [N]o religious test shall be required as a qualification for
any office of public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall
any person be incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious
belief or the absence thererof."
Utah Const, art. 1, § 4.
B. State by State Listing:
No religious test or disqualification for public office or trust, juror,
witness, right to vote, and/or admission to public schools.
Ala. Const, art. I, § 3;
Ariz. Const, art. n, § 12, and art. XI, § 7;
Aiit. Const, art. II, § 26;
Colo. Const, art. DC, § 8; (students or teachers)
Del. Conat. art. 1, § 2;
Ga. Const, art. I, § 1, H IV;
Ind. Const, art. I, §§ 5, 7;
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 7;
Md. Const. Decl. of Rights, arts. 36, 37;
Mich. Const, art. I, § 18;
Minn. Const, art. I, § 17;
Miss. Const, art. 3, § 18;
Neb. Const, art. I, § 4, and art. VII, § 11;
N.M. Const, art. VII, § 3, and art. XII, § 9;
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Or. Const, art. I, §§ 6;
Tenn. Const, art. I, §§ 4, 6;
Tex. Const, art. I, §§ 4, 5;
Utsh Cc..^. art. I, § 4, and art. X, § 8;
W. Va. Const, art. m, §§ 11, 15.
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